Peacekeeping Notes

Chapter 6 one half of the U.N Charter — "Neither Chapter 6 nor V.I.I"

Objective

By the end of this topic, learners should be able to:

- 1. Trace the history and evolution of peacekeeping, including its legal framework, and identify when the first peacekeeping mission was established;

- 2. Explain the principles of peacekeeping, with relevant examples;

- 3. State and explain the four conditions for peacekeeping;

- 4. Examine hybrid peacekeeping and its examples (unamid and amisom);

- 5. Analyze the challenges facing peacekeeping missions;

- 6. Assess the role and impact of the Force Intervention Brigade (F.I.B) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R.C);

- 7. Give examples of peacekeeping missions in Africa and their significance; and

- 8. Distinguish between successful missions (Namibia, Liberia) and failed ones (Somalia, Rwanda), using the four conditions.

1. History and Evolution of Peacekeeping

1.1 What is peacekeeping?

Peacekeeping is not explicitly mentioned in the U.N Charter. It was developed practically by the U.N to fill the gap between Chapter 6 (peaceful settlement of disputes) and Chapter 7 (enforcement action, for example, use of force under Articles 41 and 42). This in-between nature led Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to famously call it "Chapter 6 one half".

1.2 Legal framework

- Chapter 6 — pacific settlement of disputes (Articles 33 to 38).

- Chapter 7 — action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (Articles 39 to 51).

- General Assembly Resolution 37A(V) ("Uniting for Peace," 1950) — allowed the Assembly to act when the Security Council was deadlocked.

- Peacekeeping operations are authorized by Security Council resolutions and operate on the basis of host-state consent.

- Key reform documents:,, and the Action for Peacekeeping (A.4.P) agenda.

1.3 The first peacekeeping mission

- UNTSO (U.N Truce Supervision Organization) — established in May 1948 to monitor the ceasefire between Israel and its Arab neighbors. It was the FIRST peacekeeping mission (an unarmed observer mission).

- UNEF I (U.N Emergency Force 1) — established in November 1956 during the Suez Crisis to supervise the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli troops from Egypt. It was the FIRST armed peacekeeping force and the model for later operations.

1.4 Evolution

- First generation (1948 to 1989) Classical or"traditional" peacekeeping — monitoring ceasefires and buffer zones during the Cold War (for example, U.N.M.O.G.I.P, U.N.F.I.C.Y.P, U.N.D.O.F).

- Second generation (post-1989): "Multidimensional" peacekeeping after the Cold War — elections, police, human rights, state-building (for example, U.N.T.A.G in Namibia, U.N.T.A.C in Cambodia).

- Third generation (1990s–present): "Robust" peacekeeping in internal conflicts, with mandates to protect civilians and sometimes use force offensively (for example, monusko in D.R.C).

2. Principles of Peacekeeping (with examples)

The U.N has three core principles, first articulated with UNEF I and formalized in the 2008 Capstone Doctrine:

2.1 Consent of the parties

Peacekeepers are deployed only with the consent of the host state and the main parties to the conflict.

- Example: U.N.M.O.G.I.P and U.N.D.O.F operate only because both sides agreed. When consent collapses, missions struggle — for example, minusma was forced to withdraw from Mali in 2023 after the military junta demanded its departure.

2.2 Impartiality

Peacekeepers must not take sides; force may only be used based on the threat, not the identity of the actor.

- Example: unifil patrols the Blue Line without favoring either side. Impartiality is not neutrality: a peacekeeper can act firmly against a party violating the peace, but must do so consistently.

2.3 Non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate

Peacekeepers traditionally do not fight wars; they may use force only to protect themselves, civilians, and the mission.

- Example: UNEF I was explicitly prohibited from using force except in self-defence — a deliberate design to keep it in"Chapter 6 one half" territory.

- Modern tension: this principle has been stretched by"robust" mandates — for example, the monusko Force was given an offensive mandate to"neutralize" armed groups, raising debate about whether it still counts as peacekeeping.

3. The Four Conditions for Peacekeeping

Related to the principle of consent are the four conditions for peacekeeping. For a peacekeeping mission to be deployed and to succeed, four basic conditions must be present. If any one of them is missing, the mission is likely to fail.

Condition 1: A peace to keep

There must be a ceasefire or a peace agreement between the parties. Peacekeeping is not war-fighting; a peacekeeping force cannot create peace by itself — it can only help maintain and consolidate an existing peace.

- Where it existed: Namibia;.

- Where it was absent: Somalia (no agreement among the warlords — the mission was sent into an ongoing war); Rwanda (the Arusha Accords were never implemented before the genocide began).

Condition 2: Consent of the parties

The host state and the main parties to the conflict must agree to the deployment of the mission. Consent is the foundation of peacekeeping — without it, the mission becomes an occupying or enforcement force. (This is the first principle in practice.)

- Where it existed: full consent of South Africa and swapo in Namibia; consent of Liberia's government and factions.

- Where it collapsed: Somalia (warlords, especially Aidid, rejected the mission — leading to "Black Hawk Down" and withdrawal); Rwanda (consent became meaningless once the state itself collapsed and genocide began).

Condition 3: Commitment to the peace process

The parties must show a genuine political will to implement the peace agreement — to negotiate, disarm, allow elections, and refrain from returning to war. Consent on paper is not enough.

- Where it existed: swapo and South Africa both committed to the transition to independence; Liberia's factions accepted disarmament and elections under eco-was and U.N pressure.

- Where it was absent: Somali warlords signed nothing and fought on; in Rwanda the extremist Hutu leadership never intended to implement the Arusha Accords and used the mission's presence as cover.

Condition 4: A clear and achievable mandate

The Security Council must give the mission a clear mandate — identifiable objectives, adequate resources (troops, equipment, mobility), and a realistic timeframe. The mandate must match the situation on the ground.

- Where it existed: Namibia (clear objective: elections and independence, adequately resourced); Liberia (disarmament, S.S.R, elections, well resourced with U.S backing).

- Where it failed: Somalia (mandate drifted from humanitarian relief to enforcement the mission could not sustain); Rwanda (weak, passive mandate — troops were observers with no authority or means to stop mass killings, and were reduced from 2,500 to about 270 during the genocide).

4. Hybrid Peacekeeping — U.N and A.U

A hybrid mission is one jointly planned, mandated, staffed, and supported by more than one organization — typically the U.N and a regional organization like the African Union.

Key features

- Combines U.N legitimacy and resources with the A.U's local knowledge, speed, and political acceptability.

- Joint command structures, funding arrangements, and mandates.

Examples

- unamid — the First-ever hybrid peacekeeping mission, created by U.N.S.C Resolution 1769.

- amisom — an African-led, U.N-backed mission ("partnership peacekeeping", a hybrid-style arrangement).

- A.U–U.N Joint Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security (2017) — formalized cooperation, including the principle that the U.N should finance A.U-led missions.

Example 1: unamid — Darfur, Sudan (2007 to 2020)

- Formed by merging the African Union Mission in Sudan (amis) with a U.N component; authorized by U.N.S.C Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007.

- Authorized strength of about 26,000 personnel — one of the largest missions ever.

- The A.U acted as a "middleman": the hybrid structure was the main reason the Sudanese government accepted a peacekeeping mission in Darfur at all.

- Limited success: it facilitated humanitarian access and negotiated the Doha peace document, but never stopped the violence; Sudan pushed it out in 2020.

Example 2: amisom — Somalia (2007 to 2022)

- The African Union Mission in Somalia (amisom) was created by the A.U Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 and authorized by the U.N Security Council on 21 February 2007 — an African-led, U.N-backed mission ("partnership peacekeeping", a hybrid-style arrangement).

- Mandate: support the Transitional Federal Government, protect key infrastructure, and later fight Al-Shabaab — evolving into a peace-enforcement (offensive) operation.

- Troops mainly from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti; logistics provided by the U.N Support Office (UNSOA); funded largely by the E.U and U.S.

- Achievements: expelled Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu (2011) and most major towns; enabled a federal government and elections.

- Costs and criticisms: the A.U's longest, largest, most expensive, and DEADLIEST peace operation; heavy casualties, civilian harm, and sexual exploitation allegations; dependent on external funding rather than U.N assessed contributions.

- Transition: replaced by atmis (African Union Transition Mission in Somalia) in April 2022, and by aussom from January 2025.

5. Challenges of Peacekeeping Missions

Whether traditional, robust, or hybrid, peacekeeping missions face common challenges. The main ones are:

- 5.1 Consent and sovereignty problems — host governments can withdraw consent (Mali expelled minusma in 2023; Sudan pushed unamid out in 2020; Somali warlords rejected unosom). Peacekeepers deployed where there is no peace to keep are forced into war-like conditions.

- 5.2 Command and coordination problems — complicated chains of command (U.N and A.U in hybrids; A.U, U.N, E.U, U.S and bilateral partners in amisom) cause confusion, slow decisions, and blurred accountability.

- 5.3 Resource and funding gaps — chronic underfunding; troops often lack helicopters, intelligence, and medical support; A.U-led missions like amisom depend on external donors instead of stable U.N funding.

- 5.4 Troop quality and caveats — limited training and equipment; national caveats restrict what contingents may actually do; troops may be poorly suited to the terrain and conflict.

- 5.5 Protection of civilians versus spoilers — missions mandated to protect civilians often lack the means (for example, massacres continued in Darfur and eastern D.R.C despite peacekeepers' presence); spoilers sign agreements but keep fighting.

- 5.6 Misconduct — sexual exploitation and abuse, corruption, and human rights violations by peacekeepers damage legitimacy and host-population trust (documented in missions from the D.R.C to amisom).

- 5.7 Loss of life — peacekeepers are increasingly direct targets of armed groups (for example, the 2017 Beni ambush in D.R.C that killed 15 Tanzanian peacekeepers; amisom was the deadliest peace operation of its era).

- 5.8 Mission creep and unclear mandates — ever-growing mandates without matching resources or timeframes; mandates that drift from protection to enforcement without a political strategy (Somalia, and the F.I.B debate in the D.R.C).

6. The Force Intervention Brigade (F.I.B) in the D.R.C

6.1 Background

The D.R.C conflict involved numerous armed groups, notably the M.23 rebels and the F.D.L.R (genocidal ex-Rwandan militia), in the mineral-rich east. Previous MONUC/monusko mandates were criticized for being too passive.

6.2 Creation and mandate

- Established by U.N Security Council Resolution 2098 of 28 March 2013 as a specialized unit within monusko.

- Composed of about 3,069 troops, mainly from Tanzania, South Africa, and Malawi.

- Mandated to carry out targeted offensive operations to "neutralize and disarm" armed groups — the FIRST U.N peacekeeping unit ever given an explicit peace enforcement (offensive) mandate.

6.3 Operations and results

- In 2013, the F.I.B, alongside the Congolese army (F.A.R.D.C), defeated the M.23 rebellion — M.23 surrendered in November 2013.

- However, other armed groups (F.D.L.R, A.D.F) persisted, and M.23 returned in 2022, showing the limits of a military-only approach.

6.4 Significance and controversies

- Blurred the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement — critics argue it contradicts the non-use-of-force principle and threatens impartiality.

- Exceptionality debate: Resolution 2098 stated the F.I.B was established "on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent", yet later resolutions kept renewing it.

- Losses: 15 Tanzanian soldiers were killed in the December 2017 Beni ambush — one of the deadliest attacks on U.N peacekeepers in history.

- Human rights concerns: operating alongside the F.A.R.D.C, which had a poor human rights record, risked tainting the mission.

- Strategic lesson: the F.I.B proved that force can win battles but not peace — without governance, political deals, and regional cooperation, armed groups return.

7. Examples of Peacekeeping Missions in Africa (and their Significance)

Table summary: Key United Nations and African Union peacekeeping missions in Africa, ranging from early efforts in the 1960s to ongoing operations. The missions vary widely in outcome, from landmark failures like UNAMIR in Rwanda, which stood aside during the 194 genocide, and UNOSOM I and II in Somalia, marked by the Black Hawk Down incident, to notable successes such as UNTAG in Namibia, which supervised the transition to independence, and UNMIL in Liberia, which provided 15 years of stability. Significant milestones include MONUC and MONUSCO as the largest-ever UN mission, UNAMID as the first hybrid AU-UN mission, and MINUSMA as the deadliest mission. Other ongoing efforts include UNMISS in South Sudan, the largest protection-of-civilians operation, and the AU-led ATMIS in Somalia, the African Union's longest and deadliest operation.

8. Successful Peacekeeping Missions in Africa

8.1 U.N.T.A.G — Namibia (1989 to 90)

- What it did: supervised the end of South African occupation, the ceasefire, and free elections won by swapo; Namibia became independent in March 1990.

- Why it succeeded (the four conditions): (1) a peace to keep — ceasefire and agreement existed; (2) full consent of South Africa and swapo; (3) both sides committed to the transition; (4) a clear, achievable mandate (elections and independence), adequately resourced and phased.

- Significance: the U.N's first clear success in Africa and the template for later multidimensional missions.

8.2 U.N.M.I.L — Liberia (2003 to 18)

- What it did: supported the end of a civil war that had killed about 250,000 people; disarmament; security sector reform; three peaceful elections.

- Why it succeeded (the four conditions): (1) a peace to keep — the 2003 Accra agreement; (2) genuine consent of the government and factions; (3) commitment to D.D.R and elections under eco-was pressure; (4) a clear mandate matched with strong resources (U.S backing).

- Significance: the U.N's benchmark "success story" — closed in 2018 with stable institutions and peaceful transfers of power.

9. Failed Peacekeeping Missions in Africa

9.1 unosom I & 2 — Somalia (1992 to 95)

- What happened: unosom 2's enforcement mandate collapsed after the October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu ("Black Hawk Down"), which killed 18 U.S soldiers; the U.S and U.N withdrew by March 1995.

- Why it failed (the four conditions): (1) no peace to keep — no agreement among the warlords; (2) consent collapsed — Aidid's faction rejected the mission; (3) no commitment to any peace process; (4) an unclear mandate that drifted from relief to enforcement the mission could not sustain.

- Significance: the"Somalia syndrome" made the U.N (and the U.S) reluctant to intervene elsewhere — a direct factor in the failure in Rwanda (1994) and the delayed response in Darfur (2003).

9.2 UNAMIR — Rwanda (1993 to 96)

- What happened: the mission was reduced from 2,500 to about 270 troops at the start of the 1994 genocide, in which about 800,000 people were killed in 100 days; the Security Council refused reinforcements during the killing.

- Why it failed (the four conditions): (1) no peace to keep — the Arusha Accords were never implemented; (2) consent collapsed with the state itself; (3) the genocidal regime was never committed to the process; (4) a weak, passive mandate with no authority or means to intervene — and troops were cut mid-genocide.

- Significance: the defining catastrophe of U.N peacekeeping history; drove the Responsibility to Protect and modern protection-of-civilians mandates.

10. Conclusion

Peacekeeping has evolved from simple ceasefire observation into complex, sometimes robust operations. Its three principles — consent, impartiality, and limited use of force — remain the foundation, together with the four conditions for deployment and success. They are, however, under growing strain from hybrid arrangements and forceful tools like the F.I.B in the D.R.C.

The four conditions explain the African record: where there was a peace to keep, genuine consent, commitment to the process, and a clear achievable mandate, missions succeeded (Namibia, Liberia). Where any of these was missing, they failed (Somalia, Rwanda). Force can win battles — the F.I.B proved that in 2013 — but only these four conditions build peace.