Case Study: Ge’s Digital Industrial Strategy
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Case Study: Ge's Digital Industrial Strategy
Company Background
Thomas Edison established the Edison General Electric Company in 1890. Two years later, it merged with a competitor, the Thomson-Houston Company, to form General Electric Company. From its beginning, G.E prioritised research and development. Over the next 128 years, G.E matured into one of the world's largest conglomerates and accumulated more than 150,000 patents for its many consumer and industrial products (for example, the incandescent light bulb; the X-ray machine; the electric fan; the refrigerator; the jet engine; and the magnetic resonance imaging, or M.R.I, machine).
The company's culture placed a high value on learning and professional development. In 1956, G.E built an educational campus at Crotonville, New York, in an effort to become “the best-managed company” in the world. G.E spends more than $1 billion annually on employee training. And indeed, for much of its life, G.E enjoyed a reputation as a “superbly managed company.”
But after 2000, the rapid advance of technology, free trade, and changes in customer behaviour, combined with changing global power dynamics and other macroeconomic influences such as fluctuating oil prices, put pressure on industrial companies to differentiate themselves to become more competitive. Globalisation threatened to commoditise many G.E product businesses. Annual revenues peaked in 2008 at more than $180 billion, but since 2013, G.E revenues have remained below $120 billion. In 2015, G.E had an industrial base of more than $240 billion in service contracts and market presence in 130 countries organised in six major business units.
The Digital Industrial Strategy: A Radically New Business Model
General Electric's revenues do not come merely from selling big machines. Most of its revenues come from servicing those machines via customer service agreements (C.S.A's), now worth some $180 billion in all, that can stretch for 20 years or more following a sale what is known as backlog. G.E's transformation into a digital industrial company means developing a closer—and far more entwined—relationship with clients. To understand how this strategy differs from how G.E made money in the past, you may frame it as the third wave in how G.E serves its clients:
- First wave [1960s and 1970s]: When a product that G.E sold or built for a customer breaks, G.E sends engineers to fix it.
- Second wave [1980s and 1990s]: Service agreements assured customers that a G.E–built product [e.g., jet engine or turbine] would achieve a certain level of performance. G.E delivered on this guarantee through routine maintenance based on its experience with the wear and tear of its parts.
- Third wave [2015 onwards]: Enabled by data and analytics, G.E can strike an agreement with a customer for a certain kind of outcome, rather than a certain kind of functionality. It is not only about measuring whether a jet engine is working up to its specifications, or about repairing it on time, but whether it is delivering, say, the agreed-upon amount of peak operational time.
“We're getting to the point of selling trust, not engines,” says Brad Surak, a G.E software manager. “Or we're selling locomotion, not locomotives. And we guarantee that back to our customers. If an engine breaks down on a Southwest Airlines jet full of passengers sitting on a tarmac and they need to take passengers out of the plane and reroute it, we pay penalties to them because of it.”
General Electric's Revenue Generators
Image summary: A grid of six informational panels describing different business sectors for a company: Power, Renewable Energy, Oil & Gas, Aviation, Healthcare, and Transportation. Each panel lists a specific mission statement, a set of major products, and associated digital solutions tailored to that industry. The figure illustrates the company's diversified portfolio across energy, medical, and transport infrastructure.
Scenario
January 2014. General Electric C.E.O Jeff Immelt sits in his office with Chief Marketing Officer Bethh Comstock and Bill Ruh, G.E's new Chief Digital Officer. They are reviewing the latest report of completed and potential customer contracts for G.E's new Industrial Internet initiative. Now a little over two years after announcing the initiative and betting more than $1 billion on its rollout, G.E can already directly attribute over $800 million in sales to the effort. Yet these numbers represent only a tiny portion of G.E's annual revenues—close to $146 billion for 2013. Immelt and his team worry: Are they doing enough to give the initiative traction within G.E? Can G.E, an industrial machines manufacturer, sell outcomes-based services based on analytics and software?
G.E's Industrial Internet initiative proposes an open global network that connected machines, data, and people, providing G.E's varied customer base with real-time and predictive solutions to optimise their operations. G.E's suite of Industrial Internet offerings is designed not only to create and sell “smart” software–enabled machines but also to provide outcomes-based services contingent on improving operational performance via data collected and analysed in cooperation with customers.
Wall Street and technology analysts project that the Industrial Internet (also known as the Internet of Things or IoT) would generate tremendous value in both increased revenues and decreased costs. Analysts estimate the Industrial Internet would create $14.4 trillion in economic value between 2013 and 2022. By that time, they project that Industrial Internet–related technology spending would exceed $514 billion. Some G.E customers are already seeing benefits from their connected machines. For example, improving airline engine efficiency by 1% equated to $2 billion in annual savings. Integrating dispatcher data with customer data improved a carrier's delivery times by 10.4%.
Immelt felt the initiative was an opportunity that G.E could not afford to ignore. He says to Comstock and Ruh, “We have new non-traditional 'competitors' starting to approach our long-standing clients. I.B.M mostly, but sap and big data start-ups are telling our customers they can provide these analytics and services, on G.E assets.”
“But what are their business models?” Ruh asks, “and have we made a firm decision on whether we are pursuing the outcomes-based model?”
“The outcomes-based model will be quite a challenge,” says Comstock, “99% of our sales force sells 'big iron.' They are used to selling capital goods versus gain share or revenue-share arrangements with our customers. They are used to talking to operations managers who run the plants that our equipment is in. Now we need to expand our message to the entire C-suite, showing how we can help run all their assets and, ultimately, their enterprise better.”
April 2016. You receive a message from Jeff Immelt that he will not be presiding over the next regular Board Meeting slated in June. In the last shareholders meeting, a group of shareholders came forward to petition for an executive session* of the Board of Directors. In their petition, they claimed that the purpose of the executive session is to review several investments and expenditures relating to the digital industrial strategy, specifically with the aim to ensure that G.E shareholders will get a return on their investment. Appended to the petition are a few pages of key financial metrics and charts. One of those pages features G.E's annual reported earnings from 2009 to 2015 and a chart of G.E's stock price from January 2000 to March 2016 (see the table and chart below).
June 2016. The prospectus of the investments and expenditures you have to review in the upcoming executive session finally arrived. The Board will convene for that session next week. Since you joined the G.E Board of Directors in 2006, you have increasingly grown adept and assured in these meetings.
However, you have some apprehensions about this meeting—this is the first time the Board will be discussing the digital industrial strategy without Jeff. You will have to assess the long-term value of the digital industrial strategy without Jeff's entrepreneurial vision and managerial ingenuity to guide your discussion. You have also come to suspect that this executive session is strategic: the petitioning shareholders must be setting up G.E for a hostile takeover.
: Image summary: A financial table showing the statement of earnings from 2009 to 2015. While revenue and net income fluctuated and generally trended downward toward 2015, the company experienced a sharp decline in net income in the final year, moving from a profit of over 13,000 million in 2010 to a net loss of over 6,000 million in 2015. The takeaway is that the company's overall profitability significantly deteriorated by the end of the period.
: Image summary: A line chart showing the GE stock price from 2000 to 2016. The price reaches a record high in August 2000, declines sharply after Jeff Immelt takes over in September 2001, and reaches a financial crisis low in March 2009 before gradually recovering through 2016. The overall trend shows a significant long-term decline in stock value from its peak in 2000.
:Image summary: An infographic detailing GE's digital strategy for 2015, featuring a reorganization into a "GE Digital" unit headquartered in San Ramon, CA. The layout shows a unified corporate organization integrating product management, commercial, software engineering, and information technology, while appointing dedicated Digital Officers at each business. A financial table shows rising digital revenues from $48 billion in 2014 to $58 billion in 2015, with a target of $15 billion in revenues by 2020 and a $500 million digital thread cost productivity goal for 2016. The takeaway is that GE is restructuring its entire organization to integrate digital capabilities across all businesses to drive sales and create shareholder value.
G.E's Calculated Bet on Analytics
By now, the imminent onset of the Internet of Things isn't a “dark horse” anymore. Nor is it a mystery that one of the biggest players in the emerging IoT game is G.E. But most people aren't just wondering whether G.E's IoT gamble will pan out in the end — they're also wondering what playing a similar hand might mean for their organization. Fortunately, G.E's “big bet” gives us insight into four transitions stemming from the soon-to-be ubiquitous stream of IoT data.
Transition #1: The transition from reactive to proactive. The standard mantra of IoT goes like this: With countless of interdependent parts, something is bound to break, fail, or decrease in performance — whether it's an oil refinery, a jet engine, or a small patch of material within miles upon miles of natural gas or oil pipeline, there is no question in anyone's mind that entropy or the environment will somewhere create a breakdown in the system. The IoT's ultimate raison d'être — one that G.E is investing in heavily — is to give everyone a heads up on what specific thing will break and when its performance will sag, so that those who make repairs can be in the right place at the right time to avoid an Aliso Canyon-type equipment failure that leads to a natural, economic, and public health disaster.
The concept of anticipating isn't new; organizations have long prepared for problems by preordering parts according to an average life expectancy, servicing equipment at routine intervals, or locating repair stations so that average response time is low. But G.E's work with sensor data underscores the depth of evidence that can bolster companies' preparation as well as the breadth of interconnected organizations that can benefit from it — and those are the new factors that IoT allows. In the case, this depth and breadth let G.E and others know the ways in which specific pieces of equipment and machines are not average, profiting by being precisely prepared for (or even preventing) adverse events — meaning, they spend exactly the time and resources needed to address them, no more and no less, in contrast to the outlays made by other organizations expensively over-preparing or cleaning up after a disastrous equipment failure.
Transition #2: Analytics helps organizations transition from myopic to holistic. G.E knows that, best case, their equipment is a small fraction of the total equipment at a site, yet all of these other components work together with G.E's components. As processing, storage, and communication costs continue their relentless decline, it is feasible to gather data on more and more equipment. Combining data from more equipment lets G.E help their customers avoid analytical myopia, where pursuit of isolated gains can distract from the bigger picture. For G.E, this holistic approach prompted them to work to integrate data from multiple customers — even competitors' machines.
Unsurprisingly, G.E has struggled with this step, as everyone loves the idea of benefiting from everyone else's data, but is far less excited about sharing their own — a tragedy of the commons. The potential is there, but incentives are not well aligned.
Transition #3: Analytics helps organizations transition from physical to digital. G.E has long been known for physical products — lighting, radios, televisions, turbines, industrial automation, motors, locomotives, jet engines, etcetera But the company's big bet on digital is, well, big. Huge, even.
Moving away from a product-centric sales focus is a radical change — and it's not without risks. Certainly the Predix platform offers G.E another way to provide additional value. In G.E's case, a complete switch from atoms (physical) to bits (digital) is unlikely and unnecessary — the optimal solution will likely be a blend, where the physical and digital products create the most value by working together.
If it's done well, G.E may create a virtuous cycle of physical and digital lock-in as customers embed G.E components not only in their infrastructure, but also their processes. Done poorly, G.E may find itself casting aside a century of experience to become just another cloud vendor.
Transition #4: Analytics helps organizations transition from people to machines. As society races to build smarter and smarter machines, not every retiring member of the “aging workforce” will be replaced by another worker, or at least not one doing the same job. This also isn't new; the type of work people do is always changing. What has changed is the efficacy of ways to capture and codify the “departing knowledge” — which, for G.E, starts with capturing vast data.
Not all of it will be immediately useable or eliminate the need for workers. However, data and analytics will change the mix of people that G.E needs going forward as more and more operational knowledge is embedded into algorithms.
So is G.E actually making a “big bet”? Betting involves chance and randomness, and G.E's future in this arena is far from certain — so there is a chance this wager may be lost.
But it isn't that simple. Betting involves both calculating the stake and assessing the odds.
Consider the stake: In G.E's case, the stake of their bet on data and analytics can't be measured in isolation. The alternative of not pursuing data and analytics also has a sizeable stake. Refusing to go in this direction may not be a safe alternative, as data from devices has the potential to radically redistribute market power.
Now consider the odds: G.E can do (and is doing) a lot to improve their odds of success. Instead of waiting to see how everything turns out, G.E is working to minimize uncertainty. This work isn't dramatic or glamorous. It requires vigilance with data governance, attention to details of massive infrastructure, and adjustments in culture. They show efficacy with small pilots, make a small change, and then show efficacy again. Every small step is work, but it adds up to advantage. In this way, G.E is not only making their odds better — it's also making the potential jackpot bigger. Thus, their IoT strategy is by no means a game of Russian roulette — it's more like a fast-flowing game of poker.
What can other organizations learn from observing G.E's “big bet”?
First, keep in mind that G.E isn't starting from zero; they have an ace in the hole. They are building digital advantage from competence in complementary physical assets. Other organizations must carefully assess their baseline capabilities to know what their unique advantage might be.
Second, G.E has paid their ante to get a seat at this table. The company has a history of exploratory initiatives around analytics that gave them the experience necessary to even consider these transitions. Other organizations must put in the effort required to build basic analytical capabilities.
Third, G.E knows their cards, and they are not bluffing. Before putting in their chips, they learned what they were playing for. They learned from existing data about oil platforms to quantify the potential savings from changing unplanned maintenance to planned. They learned from consumer-facing Internet giants but recognized differences in their own context. They learned from using Predix internally to “tightly hone” their own operations before introducing it externally. Other organizations likewise need to learn where data and analytics could make a difference… and where there is less potential.