Week 5

Proportionality, Human Shields, and Starvation

Balancing Military Advantage Against Civilian Harm — The Hardest Calculations in I.H.L

Table summary: This table provides the profile and current progress of a specific participant, including their location, assigned program track, estimated weekly study commitment, and current week of the program.

“Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” is a grave breach. Additional Protocol I, Articles (5) (b) and (3) (b)

Week 4 established the foundational architecture of distinction: who and what may be attacked. Week 5 confronts the hardest operational problems that arise once a legitimate military objective has been identified. Even when a target is lawful, the attack may still be unlawful. This week examines three of the most contested and operationally critical areas in contemporary I.H.L: the proportionality rule, the human shields problem, and the prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare. All three are live legal issues in Yemen, Gaza, and Syria — conflicts you have tracked professionally and will engage with directly as an I.C.R.C delegation officer.

1.1 Proportionality: The Legal Rule

Proportionality in attack is codified in A.P I Art. 51 (5) (b) and Art. 57 (2) (a) (3). It prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. The same rule is reflected in customary I.H.L Rule of the I.C.R.C Customary Study, applicable in both I.A.C and N.I.A.C.

Four elements of the proportionality formula require precise understanding:

Table summary: This table defines the key legal elements and operational criteria used to evaluate the proportionality of military attacks, focusing on the qualitative assessment of incidental harm against concrete military advantages rather than mathematical ratios.

1.2 The Reasonable Commander Standard

The proportionality assessment is not judged by perfect information or post-attack outcomes. It is assessed against the standard of a reasonable military commander with the information available at the time of the decision. This standard has two implications that are critical for delegation work:

- It is commander-specific: the rank, experience, available intelligence, and time pressure of the actual decision-maker matter. A junior officer on the front line is assessed differently from a senior commander with full intelligence support.

- It is information-dependent: if the commander relied on false intelligence in good faith, and took all feasible precautions to verify, the attack may be lawful even if the outcome was catastrophic. If the commander ignored available information, the failure is legally attributable.

This standard is at the heart of accountability debates in Yemen (Saudi-led coalition targeting of Hudaydah port and Sanaa school buses), Gaza (I.D.F urban operations), and Syria (Russian airstrike patterns in Idlib). The I.C.R.C does not adjudicate criminal liability — but it does assess compliance with the proportionality rule and presses parties when the standard has not been met.

1.3 Cascading Civilian Harm — The Methodological Problem

Modern urban conflict has introduced a proportionality challenge that the 1977 drafters of A.P I did not fully anticipate: cascading harm. Destroying an electrical grid does not merely destroy the grid — it disables hospitals, water pumps, heating systems, food refrigeration, telecommunications, and traffic management. A single strike can deprive hundreds of thousands of civilians of essential services for months.

The I.C.R.C's position, confirmed in its 2016 Commentary update and in the 2019 Challenges Report, is that cascading harm must be included in the proportionality assessment. A commander who attacks a dual-use infrastructure target must assess not only the direct casualties at the point of impact but the reasonably foreseeable downstream humanitarian consequences. This has been fiercely contested by military legal advisers who argue that only proximate harm is legally attributable. The I.C.R.C holds the broader view.

Key Legal Text — A.P.I Art. 51(5)(b) and 85(3)(b)

Art. 51 (5) (b): “Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”

Art. 85 (3) (b): “Launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects' constitutes a grave breach of A.P I.”

Operational note: Excessive civilian harm is not just an I.H.L violation — if committed intentionally and with knowledge, it is a grave breach (potential war crime). This is the criminal liability threshold your N.S.A.G interlocutors need to understand.

1.4 Starvation as a Method of Warfare — The Absolute Prohibition

Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is absolutely prohibited in I.A.C and N.I.A.C. No military necessity argument can override this prohibition. It is one of the few absolute rules in I.H.L that admits of no exception. The prohibition has three operational dimensions:

1. Direct starvation: Deliberately withholding food, water, or other essentials from civilians to use hunger as a weapon.

2. Destruction of food sources: Attacking objects indispensable to civilian survival — crops, livestock, drinking water installations, irrigation works — when specifically intended to deny them to civilians.

3. Siege warfare: Encircling a city or area to cut off food and supplies. Permitted in I.A.C only if civilian needs are met; the deliberate use of siege to starve civilians constitutes a method of warfare and is prohibited.

In 2019, the I.C.C Statute was interpreted (by the Assembly of States Parties) to extend the war crime of starvation to N.I.A.C — a landmark development that directly affects N.S.A.G accountability. Since 2023, the I.C.C Prosecutor has invoked starvation as a method of warfare in the Gaza context.

In Darfur (unamid), you witnessed population displacement and denial of access to agricultural land as a systematic tool of conflict. The legal framework for assessing whether this constitutes starvation as a method of warfare under Art. 54 and A.P 2 Art. 14 is directly applicable. The Janjaweed burning of villages and crops — destroying objects indispensable to civilian survival — was precisely the conduct A.P I Art. 54 (2) was drafted to prohibit. Your field experience gives you concrete reference points for this week's most difficult legal concept.

This part examines human shields in detail, collateral damage estimation methodology, the starvation prohibition's scope, siege warfare, and humanitarian access as a legal obligation.

2.1 Human Shields — The Legal Framework

The human shields problem sits at the intersection of three distinct legal obligations: the prohibition on using civilians to shield military objectives, the prohibition on attacking civilians, and the proportionality rule. Understanding how these interact is one of the most operationally demanding tasks in contemporary I.H.L application.

The Prohibition on Using Human Shields

A.P I Art. 51 (7) prohibits parties from directing the movement of civilians to shield military objectives or military operations from attack. A.P I Art. 58 (b) imposes a positive obligation on defending parties to avoid placing military objectives within densely populated areas to the maximum extent feasible. Customary I.H.L Rule prohibits the use of human shields in both I.A.C and N.I.A.C. These prohibitions apply to all parties, including N.S.A.G's.

Voluntary versus Involuntary Shields — The Critical Distinction

The human shields problem produces two fundamentally different legal scenarios that require separate analysis:

Table summary: The table outlines the legal distinctions between involuntary and voluntary shields, noting that while involuntary shielding does not alleviate the attacker's obligations to protect civilians, the legal status and protection of voluntary shields remain a point of contention between international organizations and some states.

Effect on Proportionality Calculation

The use of human shields — whether voluntary or involuntary — does not eliminate the proportionality obligation. The I.C.R.C's position is unambiguous: an attacking party remains bound by the proportionality rule regardless of the defending party's violations. The defender's violation of the prohibition on using human shields is a separate legal wrong that does not transfer to the attacker or reduce the attacker's obligations.

Some military manuals (U.S, Israel) argue that the defending party's deliberate use of civilians as shields shifts some of the moral and legal responsibility for civilian casualties to the defending party. The I.C.R.C accepts that responsibility is shared but does not accept that this reduces the attacker's independent proportionality obligation. Both parties are simultaneously and independently bound.

Table summary: The ICRC outlines that while using human shields is a serious violation of international humanitarian law by the defending party, it does not alleviate the attacking party of its obligation to ensure proportionality. Civilian status remains intact regardless of proximity to military targets, and attacks resulting in excessive incidental harm are considered unlawful, meaning the responsibilities of both the defender and the attacker exist independently and simultaneously.

2.2 Collateral Damage Estimation (C.D.E) — Military Methodology and I.H.L

vidaern military torces conduct formal Collateral Damage Estimation (C.D.E) before authorized strikes on military objectives. Understanding C.D.E is essential for I.C.R.C dialogue with state military counterparts, who will reference their C.D.E processes in response to civilian harm allegations.

Table summary: The table outlines the Collateral Damage Estimation process, mapping specific stages of military content—ranging from target characterization and weapon selection to casualty estimation—to their corresponding International Humanitarian Law legal requirements.

Table summary: The table outlines the relationship between specific stages of the Collateral Damage Estimation process, the corresponding military content required for each, and the International Humanitarian Law legal requirements they fulfill, specifically focusing on proportionality assessments and the implementation of mitigating measures.

The I.C.R.C's engagement point: C.D.E processes are legally relevant evidence of compliance or non-compliance with proportionality obligations. When the I.C.R.C documents civilian harm, it requests the C.D.E records as part of its dialogue with state parties. States that claim compliance must be able to demonstrate that a genuine C.D.E was conducted. For N.S.A.G's without formal C.D.E processes, the I.C.R.C engages on the underlying legal obligations the C.D.E process is designed to satisfy.

2.3 The Starvation Prohibition — Scope and Boundaries

A.P.I Art. 54 and A.P.I Art. 14 prohibit starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. The prohibition has a precise legal scope that must be understood carefully:

What the Prohibition Covers

- Deliberately withholding food, water, medicine from civilian populations as a method of warfare.

• Attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless objects indispensable to civilian survival: foodstuffs, agricultural areas, crops, livestock, drinking water installations, irrigation works.

- Using siege to deliberately deny essential supplies to civilian populations.

• Blocking humanitarian access with the intent or effect of starving civilians (see 2.4 below).

What the Prohibition Does Not Cover

• Destruction of objects indispensable to survival when used solely in direct support of military operations. Destroying a food warehouse that is being used exclusively as a military supply depot is not prohibited by Art. 54.

- Siege operations that permit humanitarian access to civilians — cutting off an armed force while maintaining food/medical access for civilians is lawful siege warfare.

- Incidental harm to food supplies from otherwise lawful attacks on military objectives.

Starvation as a War Crime — the I.C.C Development

Until 2019, the Rome Statute (Art. 8) listed starvation as a war crime only in I.A.C. The Malabo Protocol amendment and the Assembly of States Parties' 2019 amendment to Art. 8 extended the war crime of'employing starvation of civilians as a method of warfare' to N.I.A.C.

In March 2024, the I.C.C Prosecutor's application for arrest warrants in the Gaza situation cited starvation of civilians as a method of warfare as one of the alleged crimes. This is the first application of the extended N.I.A.C starvation war crime provision. The Prosecutor alleged that the deliberate restriction of humanitarian aid, destruction of food infrastructure, and blockade measures constituted both a violation of I.H.L and a war crime.

Delegation implication: When engaging N.S.A.G's or states on humanitarian access blockades, you now have a war crime argument available, not merely an I.H.L violation argument. Know the distinction and when to deploy each.

2.4 Humanitarian Access as a Legal Obligation

The denial of humanitarian access is not merely a political or operational problem. It is a legal violation with specific treaty and customary foundations. Understanding the legal framework enables the I.C.R.C to move beyond appeals and assert binding obligations:

Table summary: This table outlines the legal foundations of international humanitarian law regarding the passage of relief supplies and provides corresponding examples of their application across various conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa region, including both international and non-international armed conflicts.

The right of control: parties may inspect and control humanitarian relief to ensure it does not benefit combatants. This right does not permit arbitrary denial or indefinite delay. Refusal of access must be justified on specific, verifiable military grounds — not as a general security measure or political lever. The I.C.R.C consistently challenges refusals that do not meet this standard.

2.5 Siege Warfare — Lawful and Unlawful

Sieges are not per say prohibited under I.H.L. Encircling an enemy force to achieve military objectives is a lawful tactic. What is prohibited is using a siege to starve or otherwise harm the civilian population as a method of warfare. The legal line is drawn by the treatment of civilians within the siege:

Table summary: The table distinguishes between lawful and unlawful siege characteristics, contrasting military objectives with the protection of civilians. Lawful actions focus on targeting military supplies and facilitating civilian safety through corridors and evacuations, while unlawful actions involve deliberately denying essential resources to civilians or using their presence as leverage.

mee-nah reference: The Syrian government's sieges of Eastern Ghouta (2013 to 2018), Madaya (2015 to 2017), and Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp (2014 to 2015) involved prolonged denial of food and medical supplies to civilian populations. U.N investigations concluded these constituted starvation as a method of warfare. The I.C.R.C engaged the Syrian government continuously on humanitarian access and conducted limited relief operations when access was briefly permitted.

Five operational principles consolidating this week's framework, each grounded in a real mee-nah conflict context.

Principle 1 — Proportionality Is Assessed Prospectively, Not Retrospectively

The proportionality rule asks what the commander reasonably anticipated — not what actually happened. A commander who conducts a genuine, good-faith proportionality assessment using the best available intelligence, takes all feasible precautions, and reaches a conclusion that a reasonable commander would reach, is legally compliant — even if the attack causes more civilian harm than anticipated due to unforeseen circumstances.

mee-nah Example: The August 2019 airstrike on a wedding ceremony in Al-Wahjah, Yemen. The coalition stated the gathering was a military meeting. Investigations found it was a civilian celebration. The legal question is not whether civilians died — they did.

The question is: what intelligence did the commander rely on, was it reasonably credible, was a genuine proportionality assessment conducted, and were all feasible precautions taken? Outcome does not retroactively determine lawfulness. Process and reasonable assessment at the time of decision are the legal standard.

Principle 2 — Human Shields Shift Moral Responsibility But Not Legal Obligation

When an armed group uses civilians as shields, it commits a serious I.H.L violation. It also makes the attacking party's proportionality calculation harder — because more civilians are present near military objectives. But it does not eliminate the attacking party's proportionality obligation. The attacking party cannot cite the defender's violation as legal permission to disregard civilian harm.

mee-nah Example: During the 2014 Gaza conflict (Operation Protective Edge), Israeli military legal advisers argued that Hamas's embedding of fighters and weapons in residential areas transferred proportionality responsibility to Hamas. The I.C.R.C's position: Hamas's violations were serious and independent I.H.L violations. But Israel's attacking obligation was not reduced. Both parties violated I.H.L independently and simultaneously. The U.N Commission of Inquiry found credible evidence of violations by both parties for different reasons.

Principle 3 — Starvation Is Absolute: No Military Necessity Exception

Unlike most I.H.L rules, the prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare admits no military necessity exception. A state may not argue that denying food to a civilian population was militarily necessary, proportionate, or required by operational circumstances. The prohibition is categorical. This places it alongside the prohibition on torture, slavery, and enforced disappearances in the hierarchy of absolute I.H.L obligations.

mee-nah Example: Yemen's humanitarian crisis (2015–present). The Saudi-led coalition's naval blockade of Hudaydah port — through which 70% of Yemen's food imports and 80% of humanitarian aid transited — has been characterized by U.N panels and the I.C.R.C as a major driver of the famine conditions affecting 17+ million Yemenis. The coalition's justification (preventing weapons smuggling) does not override the obligation to permit civilian food access. Security screening of aid is permitted; blanket blockade of civilian food supply is not.

Principle 4 — Humanitarian Access Is a Legal Right, Not a Favour

States and N.S.A.G's frequently treat I.C.R.C access requests as diplomatic courtesies to be granted or withheld at political discretion. The legal framework is different. Under Common Article 3 para 3, the I.C.R.C may offer its services to parties to a N.I.A.C. Parties shall not arbitrarily refuse. The I.C.R.C's access to conflict-affected populations is underpinned by treaty rights (G.C I Art. 9; G.C 4 Art. 10), customary I.H.L, and the I.C.R.C's specific mandate under the Geneva Conventions.

mee-nah Example: In Syria, the Syrian government imposed systematic restrictions on I.C.R.C and S.A.R.C access to besieged areas from 2012 onward. I.C.R.C legal teams repeatedly asserted the legal obligation to permit access. The government's position — that security conditions precluded access — was challenged on the grounds that the security pretext was used selectively and without genuine assessment. As a delegation officer, you will encounter this argument. The response: the right of control over humanitarian relief (to prevent diversion to combatants) is recognized — but it requires case-by-case justification, not blanket denial.

Principle 5 — Cascading Harm Must Enter the Proportionality Calculation

The reasonably foreseeable downstream consequences of an attack on dual-use or civilian infrastructure must be assessed in the proportionality calculation, not merely the direct impact at the point of strike. This principle is contested but represents the I.C.R.C's authoritative position and the direction of customary I.H.L development.

mee-nah Example: The 2015 Saudi-led coalition strike on the Sanaa airport fuel depot disabled the fuel supply for water pumping stations serving 2 million people, caused sewage treatment systems to fail, and contributed to a cholera outbreak that became one of the largest in recorded history (2.5 million cases by 2018). The direct attack caused limited immediate casualties. The cascading harm was catastrophic. Under the I.C.R.C's proportionality framework, the reasonably foreseeable humanitarian consequences — water loss, sewage failure, disease — had to be included in the proportionality assessment at the time of targeting. The failure to do so represents a proportionality violation.

3.1 The Proportionality Decision Tree

A practical sequential framework for conducting and documenting the proportionality assessment:

Table summary: The table outlines the initial step of a decision process to determine the legality of an attack, specifying the criteria for identifying a military objective and the resulting conclusion if those requirements are not satisfied.

Table summary: The table outlines a sequential decision-making process for evaluating the legality and ethics of a military strike, moving from target verification and harm estimation to the assessment of military advantage, proportionality, and the implementation of precautionary measures.

Part 4 — Weekly Scenario: The Al-Mina's Port Crisis

Setting: Wadi Al-Sharq, Week 5 continuation. The conflict between the Internationally Legitimate Government (I.L.G) and Jabhat Al-Ahrar (J.A) has entered its fourth year. The country's primary commercial port, Al-Mina', on the western coast, handles 75% of all food imports and 80% of humanitarian aid deliveries. The I.L.G, supported by Al-Dawla Al-Jadida (Adj) naval forces, has imposed a naval blockade of the port since the beginning of hostilities, citing the need to prevent J.A weapons shipments.

Current humanitarian situation: U.N O.C.H.A reports that 14 million civilians are food insecure. Malnutrition rates in J.A-controlled northern areas exceed 35% in children under five. The I.C.R.C's field teams are reporting acute shortages of medical supplies, food, and clean water across all conflict-affected areas, including I.L.G-controlled zones.

You are the I.C.R.C Delegation Officer preparing for simultaneous meetings with the I.L.G Defence Minister and the J.A Deputy Commander.

Situation A — The Port Blockade and Humanitarian Access

Adj naval forces have interdicted three humanitarian aid vessels in the past 30 days: one carrying I.C.R.C medical supplies, one carrying W.F.P food aid, and one carrying commercial food imports for the civilian market. Adj states that all three vessels were inspected for weapons and cleared, but were then turned away because the port's offloading infrastructure was destroyed in a legitimate strike two weeks ago. The I.L.G states it intends to repair the port within 60 to 90 days. During this period, no food or humanitarian aid can enter by sea.

Discussion Questions

4. Does the combination of the naval blockade and port infrastructure destruction violate the prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare?

1. Does the I.L.G's claim that the port strike was a lawful military objective affect the starvation analysis?

5. What legal obligations does the I.L.G have during the 60 to 90 day port repair period? What should the I.C.R.C demand in the meeting with the Defence Minister?

Starvation analysis: Two legal questions must be separated: (1) Was the port strike lawful as a military objective? A port used for weapons imports may qualify under Art. 52 (2) — but the proportionality assessment must include the cascading civilian harm from blocking 75% of food imports. (2) Does the resulting blockade constitute starvation as a method of warfare? If the I.L.G intends the blockade to pressure J.A by denying food to the civilian population, Art. 54 (1) is directly violated. If it is a byproduct of the military objective, the analysis focuses on proportionality and the affirmative obligation to find alternatives.

Effect of lawful port strike: A lawful military strike on a dual-use port does not justify the resulting humanitarian consequences if no alternatives are provided. A.P I Art. 54 and Art. 70 impose affirmative obligations on the I.L.G to ensure civilian access to essential supplies. The destruction of the delivery mechanism creates a corresponding obligation to establish alternative delivery routes.

I.L.G obligations during repair period: (1) Establish alternative humanitarian delivery routes (overland, alternative port, air delivery) as a matter of legal obligation, not charity. (2) Permit I.C.R.C and W.F.P vessels to use provisional anchorage and transfer to smaller vessels. (3) Expedite port repair as a humanitarian obligation. (4) Coordinate with I.C.R.C and U.N to ensure unimpeded access per Customary Rule I.C.R.C demands for the Defence Minister meeting: Assert the legal obligation to facilitate rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access (A.P I Art. 70; Customary Rule 55). Present the 14 million food-insecure figure as evidence of civilian suffering triggering the legal threshold. Request written commitment to specific alternative access arrangements within 72 hours. Frame refusal as a violation of a binding legal obligation, not a political disagreement.

Situation B — The Fuel Depot Strike

Two days ago, Adj air forces struck a large fuel storage facility on the outskirts of Madinat Al-Zaytoun. Adj intelligence assessed the facility as supplying fuel for J.A military vehicles and generators. The strike destroyed the entire facility. Post-strike assessment by I.C.R.C field teams shows: Al-Shifa Hospital (4.2 kilometers away) has lost its backup generator fuel supply and is operating on emergency reserves expected to last 48 hours; the city's main water pumping station (6 kilometers away) has lost power and stopped operating; 340,000 civilians in the city are without running water.

Adj states its intelligence did not identify any civilian dependency on the fuel depot. J.A states the depot supplied civilian infrastructure.

Discussion Questions

2. Was the fuel depot a lawful military objective? What additional information is required?

6. Assess the proportionality of the strike, including cascading harm to the hospital and water supply. Was the proportionality assessment adequate?

3. What immediate I.C.R.C response is required, and what legal arguments will you make to Adj?

Military objective: If the depot was used exclusively or primarily for J.A military vehicles and generators, the Art. 52 (2) test may be met under the'use' ground. However, a fuel depot serving a city of this size would typically be a dual-use facility. The civilian dependency on fuel for hospital backup power and water pumping creates a strong presumption that the object served civilian purposes. Adj's intelligence failure to identify civilian dependency is legally critical.

Proportionality and cascading harm: Even if the military objective test were met, the proportionality assessment is deeply problematic. Adj's claim that it'did not identify' civilian dependency must be tested against the Art. 57 (2) (a) (1) verification obligation: was the failure to identify civilian dependency a failure of feasible verification? A fuel depot supplying a major city is an obvious candidate for civilian dependency.

Failing to investigate this is not good-faith verification. The cascading harm — hospital at 48-hour shutdown risk, 340,000 without water — is precisely the kind of harm the I.C.R.C argues must enter the proportionality calculation.

Immediate I.C.R.C response: (1) Emergency fuel supply operation to Al-Shifa Hospital — treat as a medical emergency under I.C.R.C mandate. (2) Contact Adj immediately to assert the hospital's special protection and demand Adj-facilitated fuel delivery within 24 hours. (3) Document the proportionality failure: collect Adj's targeting records, intelligence basis, C.D.E process. (4) Engage Adj legal adviser with specific Art. 52 (3) civilian presumption argument and Art. 57 (2) (a) (1) verification failure argument.

Your J.2 intelligence note: The intelligence failure is the legal pivot. As a former J.2 officer, you understand that failure to task for civilian dependency assessment on a fuel depot is a planning failure, not an intelligence limitation. This is the argument to make to the Adj legal adviser.

Situation C — J.A's Siege of Al-Qal'ah

J.A forces have encircled the town of Al-Qal'ah (population 85,000) for 11 weeks. The town contains a small I.L.G military garrison of approximately 400 soldiers. J.A's stated objective is to force the I.L.G garrison to surrender. J.A has allowed no food, water, or medical supplies to enter Al-Qal'ah since the encirclement began. J.A's Deputy Commander tells you: "The civilians should put pressure on their soldiers to surrender. If they suffer, it is the I.L.G's fault for hiding behind them." Malnutrition has been documented by the I.C.R.C's field team, with 12 deaths of children under five recorded in the past 3 weeks.

Discussion Questions

4. Does J.A's siege of Al-Qal'ah violate the prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare? Apply A.P 2 Art. 14 and Customary Rule 53.

7. How do you respond to the J.A Deputy Commander's statement? Address both the legal argument and the delegation communication strategy.

5. What specific I.C.R.C demands should you make, and what leverage does the I.C.R.C have in this situation?

Discussion Notes — Situation C

Starvation analysis: J.A's siege is a textbook case of starvation as a method of warfare in N.I.A.C. A.P 2 Art. 14 prohibits starvation of civilians. Customary Rule 53 (applicable to N.S.A.G's) confirms the prohibition. The J.A Deputy Commander's statement is legally damning: he has explicitly stated the intent to use civilian suffering as pressure on the I.L.G garrison. This is the mens rea of the starvation war crime under the 2019 I.C.C Statute amendment. Eleven weeks of total denial of food, water, and medical supplies to 85,000 civilians, with documented child deaths, establishes both the prohibited conduct and its intent.

Response to the Deputy Commander: (1) Acknowledge the I.L.G garrison as a legitimate military objective — J.A may lawfully encircle and seek its surrender. (2) Distinguish clearly: the siege of the military force is lawful; the deliberate denial of civilian food and water is a separate and prohibited act. (3) Cite the explicit prohibition:'Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited' — A.P 2 Art. 14 applies to J.A because the conflict meets the A.P 2 threshold (J.A controls territory). (4) Introduce the I.C.C war crime dimension: this conduct, if continued, constitutes a war crime under the 2019 amendment. The I.C.R.C does not make criminal referrals, but it informs parties of their criminal exposure. (5) Reframe the moral argument: the 12 dead children are not I.L.G's responsibility — they are J.A's, because J.A is the party withholding food.

I.C.R.C demands and leverage: (1) Demand immediate opening of a humanitarian corridor for food, water, and medical supplies. (2) Request access for I.C.R.C field team to document civilian conditions and conduct needs assessment. (3) Propose I.C.R.C-supervised inspection of aid convoys to address J.A's concern about military diversion. (4) Leverage: J.A's desire for I.C.R.C recognition as a party to the conflict (access to I.C.R.C services for its own wounded and detained) is contingent on demonstrating I.H.L compliance. Frame cooperation as in J.A's institutional interest.

Complete each question independently before reviewing the model answer. This week's questions focus on application and argumentation — the skills required in delegation dialogue.

Q.1. Define proportionality in attack. State the legal test and its four key elements.

Answer

Proportionality in attack prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Four elements: (1) Incidental harm: harm to civilians/civilian objects not the purpose of the attack but foreseeable. (2) Expected: assessed prospectively at the time of attack against what a reasonable commander would anticipate — not retrospectively. (3) Excessive: a qualitative judgment, not a mathematical ratio; disproportionate to the specific military advantage. (4) Concrete and direct military advantage: specific operational gain from this attack; not speculative, indirect, cumulative, or general. Hint: The reasonable commander standard is prospective. Outcome does not retroactively determine compliance.

Q.2. What is the legal difference between voluntary and involuntary human shields, and does the distinction affect the attacking party's proportionality obligation?

Answer

Involuntary shields: civilians placed against their will near military objectives by the defending party. Full civilian protection applies. Voluntary shields: civilians who freely choose to position themselves near military objectives. Also retain full civilian protection under the I.C.R.C's position — civilian status is not lost by proximity, voluntary or otherwise. Effect on attacker: The distinction does not eliminate the attacker's proportionality obligation under either scenario. The I.C.R.C's position is that both categories of shield retain civilian protection, and the attacker must account for their presence in the proportionality assessment. Some state military doctrines argue voluntary shields can be weighted differently in the proportionality calculus — the I.C.R.C disagrees. Hint: Both scenarios require a proportionality assessment. The defender's violation is a separate legal wrong, not a reduction of the attacker's obligations.

Q.3. What is the scope of the starvation prohibition under A.P I Art. 54 and A.P 2 Art. 14?

A.P I Art. 54 (1): starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited in I.A.C. A.P I Art. 54 (2): prohibits attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless objects indispensable to civilian survival (foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water, irrigation works) when specifically intended to deny them to the civilian population. A.P 2 Art. 14: equivalent prohibition in N.I.A.C. Customary Rule confirms both. Exception: objects used solely in direct support of military operations may be attacked — the military supply exception. Scope: covers direct withholding, destruction of food sources, and siege warfare that denies essential civilian supplies. Does not cover incidental harm to food supplies from lawful military attacks. War crime dimension: I.C.C Statute amendment extends starvation as war crime to N.I.A.C. Hint: The prohibition is absolute in its core. No military necessity exception exists.

Q.4. A state argues that its blockade of a port, which causes civilian food shortages, is lawful because the port is used for weapons imports. How do you assess this?

Answer

Two separate legal questions: (1) Is the blockade a lawful military measure targeting a military objective? A port used for weapons imports may qualify under Art. 52 (2) — effective contribution (weapons flow) and definite military advantage (interdicting supply). Security screening is a lawful right of control. (2) Does the resulting civilian food shortage constitute starvation as a method of warfare? This depends on intent and effect. If the blockade's effect is to deny food to civilians as a method of pressuring the opposing party, Art. 54 (1) is engaged. The state must establish alternative humanitarian access routes to fulfil its obligation to allow rapid and unimpeded humanitarian relief. Blanket denial of humanitarian access cannot be justified solely by weapons-interdiction concerns. The legal response: the right of control over relief allows inspection, not indefinite blockade. Hint: This is the Yemen/Hudaydah argument. Know both sides and the I.C.R.C's response.

Q.5. What Are the Five Stages of Collateral Damage Estimation and Which I.H.L Obligation Does Each Serve?

(1) Target characterization to Art. 52 (2) military objective test + Art. 57 (2) (a) (1) verification obligation. (2) Weaponering to Art. 57 (2) (a) (2) obligation to choose means/methods minimizing civilian harm. (3) Casualty estimation to Art. 51 (5) (b) incidental harm assessment (basis of proportionality). (4) Proportionality assessment to Art. 51 (5) (b) + Art. 57 (2) (a) (3) prohibition on disproportionate attacks. (5) Mitigating measures to Art. 57 (2) (c) advance warning obligation + Art. 57 (2) (b) suspension/cancellation duty. Hint: The C.D.E is the military implementation of I.H.L obligations. Knowing the I.H.L obligation behind each stage allows you to interrogate states' C.D.E compliance claims.

Q.6. An N.S.A.G conducting a siege tells you: 'We are only targeting the military garrison, not the civilians.' The siege has denied food and water to 80,000 civilians for 10 weeks. How do you respond?

The N.S.A.G's claim distinguishes targeting intent from the effects of the siege. The response has three parts: (1) The prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare applies to effects, not only intent. If the siege'as a method of combat' denies essential supplies to the civilian population, the prohibition is engaged regardless of whether civilians are the intended target. (2) Even if the military garrison is the intended target, the obligation to permit humanitarian access to civilians persists. Targeting the garrison does not authorize denial of civilian food and water. (3) The 10-week duration and documented civilian suffering establish the factual threshold. Demand: open a humanitarian corridor for civilian access to food, water, and medical supplies. Frame civilian cooperation as a legal obligation the N.S.A.G has signed up to by claiming to be a party to an armed conflict bound by I.H.L. Hint: Distinguish targeting intent (lawful) from siege effects on civilians (unlawful).

Q.7. Must cascading harm (e.g., hospital losing power after a grid strike) be included in the proportionality assessment?

Answer

The I.C.R.C's position: yes. Reasonably foreseeable cascading harm must be included in the proportionality assessment as part of the incidental harm calculation. This includes downstream effects on hospitals, water treatment, food distribution, and other civilian systems that depend on the struck infrastructure. The legal basis: Art. 51 (5) (b)'s reference to'incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects' encompasses harm that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of attack, not only direct casualties. The contested view: some state military doctrines include only proximate, direct harm. The I.C.R.C considers this too narrow for modern interconnected urban infrastructure. Practical implication: when engaging states on strikes against electrical grids, water systems, or fuel depots, the I.C.R.C will include documented cascading civilian harm in its proportionality challenge. Hint: This is one of the most actively contested areas in contemporary I.H.L. Know the I.C.R.C's position and the counterargument.

Q.8. You are told by a J.A commander that, since I.C.R.C is neutral, it must treat I.L.G and J.A equally and cannot 'take sides' by demanding J.A open a humanitarian corridor when I.L.G is also blocking access. How do you respond?

This argument conflates I.C.R.C neutrality with legal equivalence. The response: (1) I.C.R.C neutrality means not taking sides in the political or military dimensions of the conflict — not declaring one party right and the other wrong. It does not mean the I.C.R.C treats I.H.L compliance equally. regardless of which party is violating the law at a given moment. (2) The I.C.R.C engages all parties symmetrically on I.H.L compliance — and does engage the I.L.G on its own access obligations simultaneously. (3) The I.C.R.C's demand that J.A open the corridor is not a political statement — it is the assertion of a binding legal obligation under A.P 2 Art. 18 (2) and Customary Rule The I.C.R.C would make the same demand of the I.L.G if the I.L.G were denying access to civilians in J.A-controlled areas — and it does. (4) Neutrality is an operational principle that enables access; it is not a legal principle that suspends I.H.L obligations. Hint: This argument will be made repeatedly. Know the precise distinction between I.C.R.C neutrality (operational) and legal obligations (binding on all parties).

Part 6 — Daily Study Plan, Readings, and Week 6 Preview

6.1 Seven-Day Study Plan (10 to 12 Hours Total)

Table summary: The table outlines a week-long study plan that progresses from foundational legal concepts and specific case studies to primary source analysis and practical application through scenario work and professional simulations.

Tier 1 — Essential (Complete Before Day 4)

8. A.P.I Arts. 51 (5) (b), 54, 57, 70 — read all in full and annotate every operative obligation. Available: icrc dot org U.R.L

9. A.P 2 Arts. 14 and 18 — starvation and humanitarian relief in N.I.A.C. Available: icrc dot org U.R.L

9. A.P 2 Arts. 14 and 18 — starvation and humanitarian relief in N.I.A.C. Available: icrc dot org U.R.L 10. I.C.R.C Customary I.H.L Study, Rules 14 (proportionality), 53 (starvation), 55 (humanitarian access), 97 (human shields). Available: ihl-databases dot icrc dot org U.R.L

Tier 2 — Recommended (Complete by Day 5)

11. I.C.R.C, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed — Sections on urban warfare proportionality and starvation. Available: icrc dot org U.R.L

12. I.C.C Prosecutor, Statement on the Situation in Gaza, March 2024 — starvation as method of warfare allegation. Available: icc-cpi.int

13. U.N Panel of Experts on Yemen, 2020 Report — Hudaydah port blockade humanitarian impact analysis. Available: undocs dot org U.R.L

Tier 3 — Supplementary

14. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (4th ed.), Chapter 11: War Against Civilians — moral philosophy of proportionality (non-legal; important for delegation dialogue context).

15. I.C.R.C, Generating Respect for the Law: Engaging Armed Groups, 2011 — Chapter on engaging N.S.A.G's on humanitarian access and starvation. Available: icrc dot org U.R.L

16. Human Rights Watch, Targeting Civilians in Yemen: Coalition Airstrikes on Hudaydah (2018). Available: hrw dot org U.R.L

Arabic-Language Resource

17. Arabié et le garcon. Available at icrc dot org U.R.L. Review the Arabic text of the starvation prohibition and humanitarian access rules. Build your bilingual vocabulary for delegation dialogue.

Table summary: This table provides the definition and Arabic translation for the legal term proportionality.

Table summary: This table provides a glossary of key legal and military terms related to civilian protection and warfare, offering definitions and their corresponding Arabic translations.

6.4 Week 6 Preview — Detention, Internment, and Treatment of Persons in N.S.A.G Hands

Coming in Week 6

Week 6 moves from the conduct of hostilities to the treatment of persons who have fallen into the power of a party. Key topics:

• Detention in I.A.C: combatant and P.O.W status, G.C 3 obligations, repatriation

• Detention in N.I.A.C: no P.O.W status, Common Article 3 minimum standards, administrative detention

• I.C.R.C access to detainees: the visit regime, individual case recording, reporting chains

• Prohibition on enforced disappearances, secret detention, and denial of family notification

• Torture and cruel treatment: the absolute prohibition, its scope, and I.C.R.C response doctrine

• N.S.A.G's as detaining authorities: legal gaps, I.C.R.C engagement methodology

• Scenario: N.S.A.G detention facility in the Wadi Al-Sharq highlands — access negotiation and conditions assessment

Preparation: Review G.C 3 Arts. 4 to 5 (P.O.W status), G.C 4 Arts. 41 to 42 (civilian internment), and C.A.3 detention provisions. Note how Week 3 I.A.C/N.I.A.C classification framework determines which detention rules apply.

Week 4

Principles of Distinction and Military Objectives

Who and What May Be Attacked — The Legal Architecture of Targeting

Table summary: This table provides the profile and current progress of a specific participant, detailing their location, assigned program track, estimated study time, and current week of completion.

“In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives.” Additional Protocol I, Article 48 — The Basic Rule

The principle of distinction is the cornerstone of international humanitarian law. Without it, every other rule of I.H.L collapses into abstraction. It is the legal architecture that separates the act of war from the act of murder, the military strike from the atrocity. Every targeting decision made by a party to an armed conflict — whether a state air force, a ground commander, or an armed group leader — must be justified against this principle.

1.1 The Historical Foundation

The principle of distinction did not emerge from treaty negotiation alone. It reflects centuries of military practice and ethical tradition. The modern codification traces to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, which established that the only legitimate object of war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.

The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions built on this, prohibiting attacks on undefended towns and civilian populations. The watershed moment came with Additional Protocol I, which codified the principle in binding treaty form for the first time with comprehensive specificity.

The I.C.T.Y confirmed in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic (2000) that the principle of distinction is part of customary international law binding on all parties to all armed conflicts — whether or not they have ratified A.P I. It cannot be derogated from by military necessity, political justification, or the conduct of the opposing party.

1.2 The Four Core Prohibitions (A.P.I, Art. 48 to 56)

The legal architecture of distinction rests on four interlocking prohibitions that together define the limits of lawful attack:

Table summary: The table outlines various prohibitions under international law regarding the protection of civilians, specifying the legal basis and the nature of forbidden actions, including direct attacks on civilians, indiscriminate attacks, targeting civilian objects, and the use of violence to spread terror.

1.3 Who is a Civilian?

A civilian is any person who is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict (A.P I, Art. 50). In case of doubt, a person is presumed to be a civilian. This presumption clause is operational gold: it shifts the burden of classification onto the attacking party. If you cannot confirm combatant or fighter status, you must treat the person as a civilian.

In I.A.C, the categories are relatively clear: members of the armed forces of a party (Art. 43), levee en masse participants, and lawful combatants are targetable. Civilians are not. In N.I.A.C, the framework is less codified: I.H.L does not formally recognize combatant status for N.S.A.G members. Instead, it uses the concept of "continuous combat function" (C.C.F) — developed by the I.C.R.C in its 2009 Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities (D.P.H) — to determine when an individual belonging to an N.S.A.G may be targeted.

Key Legal Text — A.P I, Article 50 (Definition of Civilian)

“1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article (A),, (3) and of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.”

2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. 3. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character."

1.4 What is a Military Objective?

The definition of military objective is the pivot of all targeting law. A.P I Article (2) provides the definitive two-part test: an object is a military objective if, by its nature, location, purpose, or use, it makes an effective contribution to military action, and its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time.

Both elements of the test must be satisfied simultaneously. An object that contributes to military action but whose destruction offers no definite military advantage is not a lawful military objective. An object whose destruction would be advantageous but that makes no contribution to military action is not a lawful military objective. The test is conjunctive, not disjunctive.

Key Legal Text — A.P I, Article 52(2) (Military Objectives)

"Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."

Note: 'Nature' = inherently military use (barracks, weapons factories). 'Location' = strategic value independent of use (bridge over vital river). 'Purpose' = intended future use.

'Use' = current actual use. All four grounds are independent bases for classification.

1.5 Civilian Objects and the Presumption Clause

Under A.P I Art. 52 (3), in case of doubt whether an object normally dedicated to civilian purposes is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used. This is the civilian object presumption. It applies to churches, schools, hospitals, mosques, and other objects ordinarily civilian in character.

This presumption has enormous operational implications in mee-nah urban conflicts where armed groups routinely operate from civilian infrastructure. The presumption is rebuttable by concrete and verifiable intelligence. It is not overcome by general threat assessments, suspicion, or pattern-of-life analysis alone. This point is operationally critical: your J.2 experience in intelligence assessment maps directly onto the evidentiary standard required to rebut the civilian presumption.

Faysal's Operational Lens

In your I.S.A.F/Afghanistan experience, the distinction challenge was acute: Taliban fighters operating from compounds used as family homes; I.E.D's concealed in civilian vehicles; fighters who would lay down weapons and blend into the population. The legal framework governing these situations — the D.P.H threshold, the C.C.F concept, the civilian presumption — is exactly what you will need to explain to N.S.A.G interlocutors who argue that their fighters 'are civilians' when not actively fighting. The I.C.R.C position is clear: continuous combat function, not momentary civilian appearance, determines targeting status.

This part examines the Direct Participation in Hostilities (D.P.H) threshold, the proportionality rule, precautionary obligations, and the special protection regime for certain objects.

2.1 Direct Participation in Hostilities (D.P.H)

A civilian loses protection from direct attack for such time as he or she directly participates in hostilities. This rule creates a temporary and conditional loss of protection — not a permanent status change. The I.C.R.C's 2009 Interpretive Guidance on D.P.H sets out three cumulative criteria that must all be met:

Table summary: The table outlines the three essential criteria for determining direct participation in hostilities, providing definitions for the threshold of harm, direct causation, and belligerent nexus, while using comparative examples from the MENA region to distinguish between acts that meet or fail to meet these legal requirements.

Critical operational point: the loss of civilian protection lasts only for such time as the civilian participates. This is the "revolving door" problem. A fighter who picks up a weapon, fires, and then puts it down and returns to civilian activities loses and regains protection with each act. The I.C.R.C's C.C.F concept (below) is the legal tool designed to address this problem in the N.I.A.C context.

2.2 Continuous Combat Function (C.C.F) — The N.I.A.C Solution

In N.I.A.C's, the "for such time" formula creates near-impossible targeting conditions against organized armed groups whose members routinely blend into civilian populations. The I.C.R.C's Interpretive Guidance introduces the concept of Continuous Combat Function: members of an organized armed group who have a continuous function entailing direct participation in hostilities may be targeted at all times, not merely when actively participating.

C.C.F is established by: (a) recruitment into the organized armed group; (b) assignment to a function that by its nature entails direct participation; and (c) continuous performance of that function. C.C.F is lost when the person genuinely and permanently ceases their combat function — not merely when they temporarily put down a weapon. This concept is controversial but reflects the I.C.R.C's operational experience. State militaries and some academics challenge it. You will need to be able to explain and defend it in delegation dialogue.

2.3 Proportionality

Even when an attack targets a legitimate military objective, it is unlawful if it is expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

Proportionality is not a mathematical formula. It is a good-faith assessment made in advance of an attack, balancing anticipated military advantage against anticipated incidental civilian harm. Both sides of the equation involve judgment, uncertainty, and inherent subjectivity. The test is what a reasonable military commander would have concluded, not what perfect hindsight reveals.

Proportionality Assessment Checklist

Military Advantage Side:

• Is the objective a legitimate military objective?

• Is the advantage concrete (specific operational benefit) and direct (not speculative)?

• Is the timing of the attack necessary for the advantage to be realized?

Civilian Harm Side:

• What is the expected number of civilian casualties (direct and indirect)?

• What is the expected damage to civilian objects and infrastructure?

• Are the civilians concentrated (market, school, hospital nearby)?

• What is the expected humanitarian impact (displacement, loss of essential services)?

Assessment:

• Is the harm excessive relative to the military advantage? If yes: attack is unlawful.

• Can precautionary measures reduce civilian harm without compromising the military advantage?

2.4 Precautionary Measures in Attack (A.P.I, Art. 57)

Article 57 imposes active, positive obligations on the attacking party before and during every attack. These are not aspirational standards — they are binding legal obligations. The three core obligations are:

1. Verification: Do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives and not civilians or civilian objects.

2. Precautions in means and methods: Choose means and methods that minimize incidental civilian harm, even when attacking a legitimate military objective.

3. Suspension or cancellation: Cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not a military objective, or that it would cause disproportionate incidental harm.

Art. 57 also requires giving effective advance warning to civilians when an attack may affect them, unless circumstances do not permit. The warning requirement is frequently at issue in mee-nah conflicts: Israeli operations in Gaza, coalition operations in Mosul, and Houthi missile attacks on Saudi civilian areas all raise Art. 57 questions.

2.5 Specially Protected Objects

I.H.L identifies specific categories of objects that enjoy enhanced protection beyond the general civilian object rules. These protections are absolute or near-absolute and cannot be overridden by military necessity:

Table summary: This table outlines various protected objects under international humanitarian law, detailing their legal bases and the specific rules that prohibit attacks against them, including medical facilities, cultural property, essential civilian survival resources, and critical infrastructure.

2.6 Dual-Use Objects — The Hardest Cases

The most operationally challenging distinction cases involve dual-use infrastructure: objects that serve both civilian and military purposes simultaneously. Classic mee-nah examples include: electricity networks powering both hospitals and military command centres; bridges used by both civilian traffic and military logistics; telecommunications systems used by both the civilian population and armed forces.

I ne legal framework requires case-by-case assessment. A dual-use object may qualify as a military objective if the military contribution and advantage tests under Art. 52 (2) are both met at the specific time of the attack. But the proportionality assessment must account for the full civilian impact — including cascading effects on hospitals, water treatment, food distribution. In the Yemen conflict, attacks on the Hudaydah port and the Sanaa electricity grid have been the subject of sustained I.C.R.C concern precisely because of this dual-use complexity.

Five operational principles that consolidate the week's framework, each illustrated with a real mee-nah conflict context.

Principle 1 — Distinction Is Absolute; Proportionality Is Relative

I ne prohibition on directly attacking civilians and civilian objects is absolute. No military necessity, no provocation, no reciprocity argument can override it. Proportionality, by contrast, involves a balancing judgment — but that judgment must be made in advance, in good faith, and against the standard of what a reasonable commander would conclude.

mee-nah Example: During Operation Cast Lead, the U.N Goldstone Report examined whether Israeli strikes on police headquarters and government buildings constituted attacks on civilian objects or military objectives. The classification turned on whether these facilities made an effective contribution to Hamas's military operations — a factual question the Report answered differently from the Israeli military's legal assessment. This divergence illustrates that distinction determinations are contested precisely because they are fact-intensive and judgment-laden. Both sides were applying the same legal standard to disputed facts.

Principle 2 — The Civilian Presumption Places the Burden on the Attacker

When in doubt about whether a person is a civilian or an object is civilian, I.H.L requires treating them as protected. This is not a passive rule — it actively places the burden of proof on the attacking party to establish military status before attacking. The attacker must take all feasible measures to verify. Feasibility is the standard: measures that can be taken given the military and humanitarian circumstances.

mee-nah Example: In Mosul (2016 to 2017), coalition forces targeting Isil fighters embedded in civilian populations faced acute civilian presumption challenges. Strikes on vehicle-borne I.E.D factories embedded in residential areas required intelligence verification against the civilian presumption. The Airwaves strike, where a U.S airstrike killed civilians based on misidentification, illustrates the cost of inadequate verification. Your J.2 background in pattern-of-life analysis and target verification is directly applicable to understanding these obligations.

Principle 3 — Military Advantage Must Be Concrete, Direct, and Anticipated

The Art. 52 (2) standard for military objectives requires that the military advantage be definite — not speculative, not aspirational, not general. 'Weakening the enemy's will to fight' or 'sending a message' does not constitute a concrete and direct military advantage. Propaganda and terror objectives are explicitly excluded.

mee-nah Example: Coalition strikes on Houthi leadership compounds in Sanaa have been justified on the basis of command-and-control function. These are legitimate military objectives if the leadership compounds genuinely contribute to military operations. But strikes on television stations and media facilities — justified as information operations — raise harder questions. The I.C.T.Y in Kupreskic held that terror attacks lacking concrete military advantage are unlawful even if a military objective is nominally present.

Principle 4 — Precautions Are Mandatory, Not Aspirational

Art. 57 precautionary obligations are legally binding, not best-practice guidelines. Verification, warning, and suspension duties apply before every attack. The standard is 'feasible' — practicable given the circumstances — not 'perfect' or 'guaranteed.' But feasibility is a genuine constraint, not an excuse for skipping precautions that could have been taken.

mee-nah Example: The August 2022 U.S airstrike killing Al-Zawahiri in Kabul involved a precision munition specifically designed to minimize civilian casualties — a precautionary measure in means and methods under Art. 57 (2) (a) (2). This is legally and operationally relevant: choice of weapon and timing of attack are precautionary decisions, not merely tactical ones. In Yemen, the coalition's failure to warn civilians before strikes on Hudaydah market areas has been a consistent I.C.R.C concern under Art. 57 (2) (c).

Principle 5 — Special Protection Is Near-Absolute and Cannot Be Traded for Military Gain

Objects under special protection regimes — hospitals, medical transports, cultural property, water systems, objects containing dangerous forces — have elevated protection that cannot be overridden by general military necessity arguments. A hospital that houses wounded combatants does not become a military objective. Only specific, concrete misuse (converting it to a military command post) can suspend protection, and even then, only after warning.

mee-nah Example: Syrian government and Russian forces' documented attacks on hospitals in Idlib (2019 to 2020) represent the clearest contemporary violations of special protection law. Physicians for Human Rights documented over 50 attacks on medical facilities in a 3-month period. The I.C.R.C's response was to publicly denounce the attacks and engage both the Syrian government and Russian authorities. This is the operational template: document the violations, assert the legal obligation, demand cessation. As a delegation officer, you must be able to articulate precisely which legal provision is violated and what it requires.

3.1 The Dual-Use Challenge in mee-nah Urban Warfare — A Framework

Table summary: The table outlines the dual-use nature of electricity grids, contrasting their essential role in supporting civilian infrastructure with their utility in powering military operations, while highlighting the legal complexities regarding target validity and the risk of disproportionate civilian harm.

Table summary: The table outlines various object types and compares their civilian functions against potential military uses that could justify their classification as military objectives, while highlighting the specific legal considerations and proportionality requirements associated with each.

Part 4 — Weekly Scenario: The Madinat al-Zaytun Targeting Crisis

Setting: Madinat Al-Zaytoun, a mid-size city in the fictional state of Wadi Al-Sharq (drawn from structural elements of Yemen, Syria, and Libya). An armed conflict between the Internationally Legitimate Government (I.L.G) and Jabhat Al-Ahrar (J.A) has been ongoing for three years. You are deployed as the I.C.R.C Delegation Officer with access to I.L.G military commanders. The I.L.G has requested an I.C.R.C meeting to discuss three targeting incidents that occurred in the past 48 hours. J.A has also contacted the Delegation separately with allegations.

Your task: Prepare the I.C.R.C's legal assessment of each situation for the Delegation Head before the meeting.

Situation A — The Market Strike

At 11:45 am, I.L.G air force struck a covered market in the Al-Rashid district of Madinat Al-Zaytoun. The strike killed 34 civilians and wounded 67. The I.L.G military spokesperson states that the market was being used as a temporary weapons storage and distribution point by J.A logistics units. I.L.G intelligence (shared with the I.C.R.C) shows two photographs taken 36 hours before the strike, showing crates being loaded from a truck into the market's rear storage area. J.A states the market was fully civilian-operated and the crates contained cooking oil.

Discussion Questions

4. Does the I.L.G intelligence meet the standard required to rebut the civilian object presumption under A.P.I I Art. 52 (3)?

1. If the market was a legitimate military objective, was the proportionality assessment met? What information would you need?

5. What precautionary obligations under Art. 57 should the I.L.G have fulfilled? What evidence would show compliance?

Civilian presumption: Two photographs taken 36 hours prior to showing crates being loaded are thin evidence to rebut the civilian presumption under Art. 52 (3). The evidence is ambiguous (crates do not confirm weapons), dated (36 hours in an active market), and not independently verified. A reasonable targeting officer would need: more current intelligence, ground surveillance or signals intelligence confirming weapons use, and corroborating indicators. The I.L.G's evidence is legally insufficient on its face to overcome the presumption.

Military objective test: Even if weapons storage were confirmed, the Art. 52 (2) two-part test must be met: effective contribution to military action (weapons storage: yes, if current) and definite military advantage from destruction (depends on significance to J.A operations). Both must be met at the time of the attack.

Proportionality: 34 civilians killed, 67 wounded. For this to be proportionate, the anticipated military advantage from destroying the weapons cache would need to be concrete, direct, and not excessive relative to this harm. Given the market was operational (11:45 am, civilians present), precautionary timing (e.g., striking at night or after evacuation) should have been assessed.

Art. 57 precautions: Warning to civilians to evacuate the area; consideration of timing to minimize civilian presence; feasibility of a more precise strike on the storage area only; cancellation obligation if civilian presence became apparent. No evidence of warning was provided. This likely constitutes a violation of Art. 57 (2) (c).

I.C.R.C position for the meeting: Express grave concern. Request full targeting analysis, intelligence basis, and proportionality assessment records. Assert Art. 52 (3) presumption and Art. 57 precautionary obligation. Conduct independent civilian casualty assessment.

Situation B — The Fighter Who Was Not Fighting

I.L.G special forces conducted a nighttime raid in the Al-Nour neighbourhood. They targeted and killed Khalid Al-Masri, a man identified by I.L.G intelligence as a J.A logistics coordinator responsible for arms procurement. At the time of the raid, Khalid Al-Masri was asleep in his home with his family. He was unarmed. His family states he had left J.A six months ago and was working as a mechanic. I.L.G intelligence states he had attended a J.A meeting two weeks prior, which signals intelligence confirms.

Discussion Questions

2. Was Khalid Al-Masri a legitimate target under I.H.L? Apply the C.C.F analysis.

6. Does the fact that he was unarmed and asleep at the time of the attack affect his targetability?

3. If his family's claim that he left J.A six months ago is true, what is the legal effect?

C.C.F Analysis: The I.C.R.C's C.C.F concept applies in this N.I.A.C context. To target Khalid Al-Masri on a continuous basis (i.e., while asleep), his C.C.F must be established: (a) membership in J.A — I.L.G asserts this, his family denies it; (b) function that by nature entails direct participation — logistics coordinator for arms procurement is a strong candidate (directly supporting military operations); (c) continuous performance — the J.A meeting two weeks prior supports this, but is not conclusive if he had genuinely disengaged.

Being unarmed and asleep: Under the C.C.F concept, this is irrelevant to targetability. A person with established C.C.F does not regain civilian protection merely because they are currently not actively fighting. This is precisely the purpose of the C.C.F concept — to address the revolving door problem. If C.C.F is established, the attack was lawful in principle (subject to precautions and proportionality).

Claimed disengagement: This is the critical legal and factual question. C.C.F is lost when a person genuinely and permanently ceases their combat function. If Khalid Al-Masri had genuinely left J.A six months ago, his C.C.F would have ceased and he would have regained full civilian protection. The J.A meeting two weeks prior is significant counter-evidence — but a single meeting may not establish continuous function, particularly if it was a one-time contact.

I.C.R.C response: The disengagement claim creates a genuine and serious doubt about targetability. Under the civilian presumption, this doubt requires treating him as a civilian. The I.L.G's intelligence does not conclusively establish current C.C.F. The I.C.R.C should: request full intelligence basis; conduct independent inquiry; engage I.L.G on the evidentiary standard for C.C.F determination; raise the case with I.L.G legal advisers.

Situation C — The Hospital Allegation

J.A contacts the I.C.R.C Delegation stating that I.L.G forces have set up a checkpoint and vehicle search operation at the entrance to Al-Shifa General Hospital in Madinat Al-Zaytoun. J.A claims that I.L.G military personnel are stopping all vehicles entering and exiting, searching for wounded J.A fighters, and have detained three men who were brought for medical treatment. I.L.G states the checkpoint is a standard security measure and that the detained individuals are confirmed J.A fighters being held under anti-terrorism law, not I.H.L. The hospital continues to function.

Discussion Questions

4. Does I.L.G's checkpoint and detention operation at the hospital violate I.H.L? Which specific provisions?

7. Does the fact that the detained individuals may be J.A fighters affect their right to medical treatment?

5. What immediate steps should the I.C.R.C take, and what legal arguments should you make in the meeting with I.L.G commanders?

Discussion Notes — Situation C

Checkpoint and medical care: G.C 4 Art. 16 and A.P I Art. 10 require that the wounded and sick be collected and cared for. A.P I Art. 15 prohibits any party from compelling medical personnel to perform acts incompatible with medical ethics. Even wounded combatants (enemy) are entitled to medical care (G.C I Art. 12 by analogy; Customary I.H.L Rule 110). A checkpoint designed to intercept wounded persons seeking medical care interferes with these obligations.

Detention of persons seeking medical treatment: Detaining persons at a hospital entrance on the basis of suspected N.S.A.G affiliation, rather than allowing their medical treatment, violates the principle of medical impartiality (G.C I Art. 12; I.C.R.C Fundamental Principle of Impartiality). The anti-terrorism framing does not override I.H.L medical protection obligations. The wounded must be treated before any legal proceedings.

Hospital protection: The checkpoint does not constitute an attack on the hospital. However, it may impede the hospital's humanitarian function, which constitutes a violation of the functional protection of medical units under A.P I Art. 12. Obstruction of medical function can amount to misuse of the hospital's protected status by the party causing the obstruction.

I.C.R.C immediate actions: Request immediate access to the three detained individuals for registration and welfare assessment. Assert right to monitor their treatment and legal status. Engage I.L.G medical commander and legal adviser to assert that medical access cannot be conditioned on security screening. Document the checkpoint operation for reporting purposes. Engage hospital director on I.C.R.C protective emblem and independent operation.

Your unamid parallel: Checkpoint interference with medical access was a documented pattern in Darfur. The same I.H.L arguments apply.

Complete each question independently before reviewing the model answer. Questions reflect I.C.R.C delegation-interview standard and operational field application.

Q.1. State the Two-Part Legal Test for Military Objectives under A.P I Art. 52(2).

Answer

An object qualifies as a military objective only if both of the following are met simultaneously: by its nature, location, purpose, or use, it makes an effective contribution to military action; and its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time. Both elements are conjunctive. Satisfying only one is insufficient. The advantage must be concrete and direct — not speculative or general. Hint:'Nature, location, purpose, use' are four independent grounds for the contribution test. Know them all.

Q.2. What is the civilian presumption and where is it codified?

Answer

Under A.P I Art. 50 (1), in case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian. Under A.P I Art. 52 (3), in case of doubt whether an object normally dedicated to civilian purposes is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used. Both presumptions place the burden of establishing military status on the attacking party. They are codified in A.P I and are reflected in customary I.H.L. Hint: There are two civilian presumptions — one for persons, one for objects. Know both.

Q.3. What are the three cumulative criteria for Direct Participation in Hostilities under the I.C.R.C Interpretive Guidance?

Threshold of harm: the act must be likely to adversely affect military operations or capacity, or to cause death, injury, or destruction to protected persons/objects. Direct causation: there must be a direct causal link between the act and the expected harm (one causal step; indirect support does not qualify). Belligerent nexus: the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another. All three must be considered as part of the action. be met simultaneously. Hint: A logistics driver far from the front line may fail the direct causation test. A civilian operating an I.E.D detonator meets all three.

Q.4. A civilian places an I.E.D on a road used exclusively by military supply vehicles, then returns home and resumes farming. Is he targetable the following morning?

Answer

This is a D.P.H revolving-door scenario. Under the I.C.R.C Interpretive Guidance, if the civilian has not assumed a continuous combat function (C.C.F), he regains civilian protection once he ceases direct participation (returns to farming). He would only be targetable again if he again directly participates. If, however, the I.E.D-planting is part of a pattern of repeated participation indicating C.C.F, a stronger case exists for continuous targetability. The key question is whether this is an isolated act (D.P.H, temporary loss of protection) or part of a pattern indicating C.C.F membership in an organized armed group. In doubt: civilian presumption applies. Hint: This is the classic 'revolving door' problem. The C.C.F concept was specifically developed to address it.

Q.5. An I.L.G commander tells you that an electricity grid can be attacked because it powers the enemy's command centre. How do you assess this?

Answer

Apply the Art. 52 (2) two-part test: Effective contribution: If the grid currently powers military command and control infrastructure, the contribution test may be met under the'use' ground. Definite military advantage: Destroying the command centre's power supply offers a concrete operational benefit. but: Proportionality must be assessed separately. If the same grid powers hospitals, water treatment, food storage, and civilian heating, the incidental civilian harm from grid destruction may be excessive relative to the military advantage of degrading one command centre. The answer is'it depends' — specifically on the proportionality assessment. A partial or targeted strike on the military feed may be feasible as a precautionary alternative. Hint: Always separate the military objective test from the proportionality assessment. They are independent legal requirements.

Q.6. Name three precautionary obligations under A.P I Art. 57 that apply before an attack.

Verification: Do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives and not civilians or civilian objects. Precautions in means and methods: Choose the means and methods of attack that avoid, or in any event minimize, incidental civilian harm (Art.

57 (2) (a) (2)). Proportionality assessment: Refrain from launching an attack expected to cause excessive incidental civilian harm. Additional: Effective advance warning when an attack may affect civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. Cancellation or suspension if the attack would cause disproportionate harm or reveals non-military target. Hint: Memorize the structure: verify — precautions — assess — warn — cancel. All are binding obligations.

Q.7. An armed group destroys a mosque they claim was used by the enemy as a weapons storage point. Is this lawful?

Answer

Cultural property (including places of worship) enjoys special protection under A.P I Art. 53 and the 1954 Hague Convention. Under general I.H.L, this protection can be suspended if the site is being used for military purposes — but only after: (a) a warning has been issued and ignored; (b) a reasonable time for compliance has elapsed; and (c) the military use is current and verified. Even then, the attack must pass the proportionality test accounting for the cultural significance of the site. In N.I.A.C, customary I.H.L Rule 38 applies: parties must respect and protect cultural property. Without verified current military use and prior warning, destruction of the mosque is a violation of I.H.L. Isil's destruction of Palmyra and the Mosque of the Prophet Yunus in Mosul are canonical violations. Hint: The warning—before-suspension requirement—is mandatory for specially protected objects.

Q.8. An N.S.A.G commander argues to you that since the I.L.G attacked his fighters' hospital, he is no longer bound to respect civilian objects. How do you respond?

Answer

I.H.L obligations are not reciprocal — a violation by one party does not release the other from its obligations. This is a foundational principle of I.H.L confirmed in A.P I Art. 51 (8): no violation of the laws and customs of war committed by one party shall release the other party from its I.H.L obligations. The prohibition on attacking civilian objects is absolute — it cannot be suspended by reprisal against civilian objects in I.A.C and applies equally in N.I.A.C through customary I.H.L. Respond clearly: the I.L.G's violations, if proven, are I.H.L violations that the I.C.R.C will address. But they do not create legal permission for J.A to attack civilian objects. Present the I.C.R.C's engagement as symmetrical — you are here to hold all parties to the same standard. Offer to formally document and transmit the hospital attack allegation to the I.L.G on the N.S.A.G's behalf. This demonstrates I.C.R.C impartiality and gives the commander a constructive alternative to reprisal. Hint: Reprisals against civilian objects are prohibited in I.A.C and argued by the I.C.R.C to be prohibited in N.I.A.C through custom. Know this distinction.

Part 6 — Daily Study Plan, Readings, and Week 5 Preview

6.1 Seven-Day Study Plan (9 to 11 Hours Total)

Table summary: This table outlines a structured weekly study plan that progresses from learning core legal frameworks and primary sources to applying that knowledge through scenario analysis and a final integration assessment.

6.2 Recommended Readings

8. Additional Protocol I, Articles 48 to 58 (primary text). Available: icrc dot org U.R.L — annotate every obligation and identify whether it is absolute or qualified.

9. I.C.R.C, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under — Executive Summary and Part 3 (C.C.F). Available: icrc dot org U.R.L

10. I.C.R.C Customary I.H.L Study, Rules 1 to 10 (distinction), Rules 97 to 103 (special protections). Available: ihl-databases dot icrc dot org U.R.L

Tier 2 — Recommended (Complete by Day 5)

11. Nils Melzer, International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction, Chapters 4 to 5. Available: icrc dot org U.R.L

12. I.C.R.C, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed — Section on urban warfare and distinction. Available: icrc dot org U.R.L

13. Human Rights Watch, Targeting: Using Human Shields in Yemen (2016) — operational application of distinction rules. Available: hrw dot org U.R.L

Tier 3 — Supplementary (Week 4 to 5 Reading Period)

14. Michael Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, Rule 38 to 42 (distinction in cyber context) — forward-looking for delegation work.

15. U.N Panel of Experts on Yemen, Reports 2018 to 2022 — targeting analysis and civilian harm documentation. Available: undocs dot org U.R.L

16. I.C.T.Y, Prosecutor v. Galic, Trial Chamber, Judgment (2003) — terror attacks against civilian population (Sarajevo sniping and shelling campaign). Available: icty dot org U.R.L

Arabic-Language Resource

17. Arabic text. Available at icrc dot org U.R.L. Review the Arabic terminology for military objectives, civilian presumption, and proportionality. Build your bilingual glossary.

Table summary: This table provides key legal terminology related to international humanitarian law, offering definitions and corresponding Arabic translations for the principle of distinction and military objectives.

Table summary: This table provides a glossary of key legal terms related to international humanitarian law, offering their definitions and corresponding translations in Arabic.

6.4 Week 5 Preview — Proportionality and the Protection of Civilians in Attack

Coming in Week 5

Week 5 deepens the proportionality analysis introduced this week, with a focus on operational application:

• Proportionality in depth: how military commanders document and justify proportionality decisions

• Collateral damage estimation: the military methodology and its I.H.L legal relationship

• The distinction between incidental harm and intended harm — the 'human shields' problem

• Voluntary versus involuntary human shields and their effect on proportionality calculations

• Starvation as a method of warfare: A.P I Art. 54, siege warfare, and the Yemen/Gaza context

• Scenario: Coalition targeting of a Houthi logistics hub co-located with a food distribution centre

Preparation: Review A.P I Arts. 51 (5) (b) and again with proportionality focus. Note the Yemen U.N Panel of Experts reports on the Hudaydah strikes.

Faysal Kafawin

Audio by Paper2Audio.

Week 3

Classification of Armed Conflicts

I.A.C vs N.I.A.C: Legal Thresholds, Criteria, and Operational Implications

Table summary: This table provides the profile and current progress of a specific participant, including their location, assigned program track, estimated study time, and current week of the program.

“The classification of an armed conflict is not a political act. It is a legal determination that activates specific obligations under international law.” I.C.R.C Commentary on Common Article 2, 2016

The classification of an armed conflict is among the most consequential determinations in international humanitarian law. It is not a political judgment, a diplomatic courtesy, or a rhetorical label. It is a legal threshold that triggers specific treaty obligations, defines which rules apply, and determines the legal status of persons involved in hostilities. Every error in classification has operational, legal, and humanitarian consequences.

1.1 Why Classification Matters

I.H.L does not apply uniformly to all forms of violence. It establishes a graduated framework calibrated to the nature of the conflict. The rules governing an international armed conflict (I.A.C) differ substantially — in scope, depth, and obligation — from those governing a non-international armed conflict (N.I.A.C). A third category, international armed conflict with non-international characteristics, has emerged through practice but remains contested.

Classification determines: which treaties apply; what rights and protections combatants, prisoners, civilians, and detainees enjoy; and the legal framework within which the I.C.R.C operates and engages parties. Misclassification is not a technical error. It can strip persons of the protections they are legally owed or, inversely, attribute obligations that do not legally apply.

1.2 The Two Primary Legal Categories

International Armed Conflict (I.A.C)

An I.A.C arises whenever armed force is used between two or more states. The threshold is low — no minimum level of intensity is required. Even a single cross-border incident involving state armed forces can constitute an I.A.C. The legal foundation is Common Article 2 of the four, which states that the Conventions apply to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict arising between two or more High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.

Additional Protocol I extends I.A.C rules to include wars of national liberation against colonial domination, alien occupation, or racist regimes. This is politically significant in the mee-nah context.

Key Legal Text — Common Article 2 (G.C I-4, 1949)

“The present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”

Non-International Armed Conflict (N.I.A.C)

A N.I.A.C is an armed conflict occurring within the territory of a single state between its armed forces and organized non-state armed groups (N.S.A.G's), or between N.S.A.G's themselves. The legal foundation is Common Article 3 — the sole provision of the Geneva Conventions applicable to N.I.A.C's — and, for states that have ratified it, Additional.

Unlike I.A.C's, N.I.A.C's require two cumulative thresholds to be met: a minimum level of intensity in the armed violence, and a minimum degree of organization among the non-state parties. These thresholds are not defined in the treaty text but have been elaborated extensively in I.C.T.Y and I.C.T.R jurisprudence, particularly in the Tadic, Haradinaj, and Akayesu cases.

Key Legal Text — Common Article 3 (G.C I-4, 1949)

“In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions...”

The text then enumerates minimum humane treatment standards and prohibits, at any time and in any place: violence to life and person, taking of hostages, outrages upon personal dignity, and the passing of sentences without regular judicial procedure.

1.3 The Classification Decision: Who Makes It?

No international authority has the exclusive mandate to formally classify a conflict. Classification is a legal determination made by states, parties to the conflict, international courts and tribunals, treaty bodies, and operational actors such as the I.C.R.C. The I.C.R.C makes its own independent classification determination for the purpose of its mandate — and this determination governs which legal framework the I.C.R.C applies in its dialogue with parties.

Importantly, states and N.S.A.G's frequently dispute classifications. States often characterize armed conflicts against N.S.A.G's as law enforcement or counter-terrorism operations to avoid I.H.L obligations. The I.C.R.C does not accept this framing when the factual thresholds of a N.I.A.C are met. This tension is at the operational heart of I.C.R.C delegation work.

1.4 Temporal and Geographic Scope

An I.A.C begins at the first use of armed force between states. It ends with a general close of military operations (G.C I-3, Art. 5 / G.C 4, Art. 6). I.H.L does not require a formal declaration of war or a peace treaty — the factual situation governs.

A N.I.A.C begins when the intensity and organization thresholds are met. It does not end automatically when hostilities pause. The I.C.T.Y in Tadic held that I.H.L continues to apply in the whole territory of warring parties, until a peaceful settlement is achieved. This has major implications for operations in fragmented conflicts such as those in Libya, Yemen, and Syria — where multiple overlapping N.I.A.C's and possible I.A.C's coexist.

In Afghanistan (I.S.A.F), the conflict involved NATO/I.S.A.F state forces alongside Afghan forces against Taliban and associated armed groups. Classification involved both I.A.C elements (initial 2001 invasion) and N.I.A.C elements (ongoing insurgency). In Darfur (unamid), the situation involved a N.I.A.C between Sudan's government and armed movements including J.E.M and S.L.M, with cross-border dimensions. Your field experience across these two contexts maps directly onto the I.A.C/N.I.A.C classification debate you will need to master for N.S.A.G delegation work.

This part examines the two classification thresholds for N.I.A.C's in detail, the special case of occupation, the phenomenon of transnational armed conflict, and the critical question of what legal rules apply in each category.

2.1 The Two Thresholds for N.I.A.C Classification

Threshold 1 — Intensity of Violence

The I.C.T.Y Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic (1995) defined a N.I.A.C as “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.” The word “protracted” signals that sporadic riots, isolated acts of banditry, or brief internal disturbances do not rise to the level of N.I.A.C.

Indicators of sufficient intensity include (but are not limited to):

• Sustained and large-scale military operations involving heavy weapons

• Collective fighting rather than individual criminal acts

- Government resort to military forces rather than police

• Nature, duration, and territorial spread of hostilities

- Civilian casualties and displacement at significant scale

• Displacement of civilian population

• External states intervening in support of parties

- U.N Security Council attention and humanitarian access concerns

Threshold 2 — Organization of the Non-State Party

The non-state party must have a sufficient degree of organization to be capable of sustained military operations and to be held responsible under I.H.L. The Haradinaj Trial Chamber identified detailed indicators:

Table summary: The table outlines the various categories and corresponding specific indicators used to assess organizational capacity, focusing on command structure, military capability, and political structure.

Table summary: The table outlines specific indicators used to determine external recognition, focusing on formal designations by international organizations or states and the existence of ceasefire agreements.

Note: No single indicator is determinative. Classification is based on holistic assessment of all available facts. This is precisely the kind of analysis an I.C.R.C delegation officer must be prepared to conduct and defend in dialogue with state counterparts who contest N.I.A.C status.

2.2 Occupation — A Special Case

Occupation is legally distinct from active armed conflict but remains governed by I.H.L, specifically the Hague Regulations (1907),, and customary I.H.L. Occupation exists when a state exercises effective control over territory to which it has no sovereign title, without the consent of the legitimate sovereign.

The legal test is effective control — the occupying power must be able to exercise governmental authority in the area. This threshold has been vigorously contested in the Israeli-Palestinian context, particularly regarding Gaza after 2005. The I.C.R.C's position is that Gaza remains occupied territory for I.H.L purposes despite Israeli disengagement, due to the degree of control exercised over its borders, airspace, and maritime zone.

This has direct relevance to your West Bank mission experience. Occupation law imposes positive obligations on the occupying power: maintaining public order, ensuring civilian welfare, and prohibiting transfer of civilian population into occupied territory.

2.3 The Complication: Transnational Armed Conflict

Contemporary conflicts often involve state armed forces operating across borders against N.S.A.G's based in a third state. Classic examples include: U.S/coalition operations in Pakistan against Al-Qaeda; Turkish military operations in northern Syria against Kurdish forces; Emirati and Saudi coalition operations in Yemen. The legal framework for these situations is unsettled.

Three competing legal frameworks are advanced:

1. The conflict is a N.I.A.C governed by Common Article 3 and customary I.H.L, with the geographic scope extending wherever the N.S.A.G operates.

2. The conflict is an I.A.C between states if the host state is unable or unwilling to suppress the N.S.A.G and consents to or acquiesces in operations.

3. There are two simultaneous conflicts: a N.I.A.C between the intervening state and the N.S.A.G, and a separate legal relationship with the host state.

The I.C.R.C's position is that the applicable legal framework must be determined conflict by conflict on the basis of the facts, and that the laws of war bind all parties regardless of the label applied. This position underlies I.C.R.C engagement in Syria, Yemen, and Libya.

2.4 Comparative Legal Frameworks — I.A.C vs N.I.A.C

Table summary: The table compares the legal frameworks of International Armed Conflicts and Non-International Armed Conflicts, highlighting that the former is governed by a comprehensive set of treaties providing combatant and prisoner of war status, whereas the latter relies on more limited protections, customary law, and domestic legal frameworks.

2.5 Additional Protocol 2 — When Does It Apply?

A.P 2 (1977) applies only to N.I.A.C's in which: (a) the N.S.A.G is under responsible command; (b) exercises such control over territory as to enable it to carry out sustained and concerted military operations; and (c) implement the Protocol. This is a higher threshold than Common Article 3. Consequently, A.P 2 applies to relatively few conflicts — and its non-applicability does not mean I.H.L does not apply. Customary I.H.L fills the gap.

A.P 2 does not apply to conflicts between N.S.A.G's. This creates a significant protection gap in fragmented conflicts such as northern Syria and post-2014 Libya, where inter-group fighting dominates. The I.C.R.C's response is to apply customary I.H.L — codified in the 2005 I.C.R.C Customary I.H.L Study — to all parties regardless of treaty status.

Part 3 — Key Principles, Thresholds, and mee-nah Applications

This part consolidates the most operationally critical principles for classification work and applies them to four real conflict situations from the mee-nah region and your mission experience.

3.1 The Five Classification Principles

Principle 1 — Facts Govern. Not Labels

Classification is determined by the objective facts on the ground, not by the terminology used by parties to the conflict. A state calling armed violence a “criminal enterprise,” “counter-terrorism operation,” or “security disturbance” does not determine the legal framework. The I.C.R.C, international courts, and other actors assess the facts independently. This principle is foundational to I.C.R.C delegation work: your interlocutor may refuse to acknowledge I.H.L applicability. Your role is to present the legal analysis, not to seek agreement.

Principle 2 — Classification Is Dynamic

A conflict can transition between legal categories as facts change. An I.A.C can transform into a N.I.A.C (e.g., post-occupation phase of the 2003 Iraq war). A N.I.A.C can acquire I.A.C characteristics if a third state intervenes (e.g., Russian state intervention in Ukraine 2014 versus 2022). A law enforcement situation can escalate into a N.I.A.C. Classification must be reviewed continuously against evolving facts. This is particularly relevant in Yemen, where the 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention transformed a pre-existing N.I.A.C into a situation with I.A.C elements.

Principle 3 — Multiple Simultaneous Classifications

A single territory can host concurrent I.A.C and N.I.A.C. This is not a legal impossibility but a factual reality in complex conflicts. In Syria, there are simultaneously: an I.A.C between the Syrian government and states using force on Syrian territory without consent; N.I.A.C's between the Syrian government and various armed groups; and N.I.A.C's between armed groups themselves. Each legal relationship carries its own applicable rules. Delegation officers must be able to identify and articulate which framework applies to which relationship.

Principle 4 — Reciprocity Is Not Required

I.H.L obligations apply to all parties to a conflict regardless of whether the other side complies. An N.S.A.G's violation of I.H.L does not release the state from its obligations, and vice versa. This principle is critical for I.C.R.C dialogue: armed groups frequently argue that their violations are justified by state conduct.

The I.C.R.C's position is unequivocal: I.H.L is not reciprocal. Both parties are bound simultaneously and independently.

Principle 5 — In Case of Doubt, Protect

When classification is unclear, the I.C.R.C applies the most protective interpretation. This is not a legal rule per say, but a humanitarian and institutional principle. In practice, where the N.I.A.C threshold is arguably met, the I.C.R.C engages both parties on the basis of C.A.3 and customary I.H.L rather than waiting for definitive classification. Protection must not be hostage to legal uncertainty.

3.2 Real Conflict Applications — mee-nah and Your Missions

Table summary: The table outlines various global conflicts and their legal classifications under international humanitarian law, highlighting the shift between international and non-international armed conflicts. It details how different legal bases, such as occupation laws or customary rules, dictate the delegation implications and the specific engagement strategies required for different parties involved in these conflicts.

3.3 The Lawfare Dimension

Classification disputes are not merely academic. States and armed groups strategically contest classification to gain political and legal advantages. Common misclassification tactics include:

• Labeling armed groups as “terrorists” to deny I.H.L applicability and I.C.R.C access

- Denying that hostilities reach the N.I.A.C intensity threshold to avoid C.A.3 obligations

- Claiming an armed group is not sufficiently organized to be an I.H.L party

• Asserting that operations are extraterritorial law enforcement rather than armed conflict

The I.C.R.C's response is to engage on the facts: documenting intensity indicators, assessing organization through field reports, and presenting the legal analysis directly to state authorities and N.S.A.G leadership. As a delegation officer, you will be the front line of this engagement. Your J.2 background — pattern-of-life analysis, order-of-battle assessment, intelligence synthesis — is directly transferable to the factual assessment required for classification determinations.

Part 4 — Weekly Scenario: The Wadi Al-Sharq Crisis

Scenario Context

You are deployed as an I.C.R.C Delegation Officer in a composite country referred to as "Wadi Al-Sharq" — a fictional amalgam drawing on real structural elements from Yemen, Libya, and Syria. The country has been experiencing internal conflict for four years. You are tasked with advising the Delegation Head on the applicable legal framework for three simultaneous developments that have unfolded in the past 72 hours.

Background: Wadi Al-Sharq has a recognized internationally legitimate government (I.L.G) based in the south. A powerful armed movement, the Jabhat Al-Ahrar (J.A), controls the northern highlands. A third armed faction, Liwa Al-Qibla (L.Q), operates in the eastern desert and has no fixed territorial control but has conducted attacks in multiple governorates. A neighboring state, "Al-Dawla Al-Jadida" (Adj), has been providing air support to the I.L.G for six months.

Situation A — The Adj Air Strikes

Al-Dawla Al-Jadida (Adj) has conducted 14 air strikes in the past 72 hours against J.A positions in the northern highlands. Adj claims these strikes are conducted at the I.L.G's formal request and with its full consent. I.L.G confirms this publicly. J.A issues a statement rejecting the strikes as foreign aggression and calls for international condemnation.

Discussion Questions

4. What legal classification applies to the Adj-J.A conflict? Is this an I.A.C, a N.I.A.C, or something else? Justify your analysis.

5. Does the I.L.G's consent to Adj operations alter the legal classification? What is the legal effect of state consent on the applicable framework?

6. J.A claims the conflict is an I.A.C because a foreign state is directly attacking them. Is this claim legally sound?

Classification analysis: The conflict between Adj (a state) and J.A (an N.S.A.G) does not automatically constitute an I.A.C. An I.A.C requires armed force between states. Adj is using force against a non-state actor. The legal framework is therefore N.I.A.C, not I.A.C, for the Adj-J.A relationship specifically. The I.L.G-J.A conflict remains a separate N.I.A.C (pre-existing internal conflict).

I.L.G consent: When a state uses force against an N.S.A.G at the invitation of the host state, the intervention does not transform the N.I.A.C into an I.A.C. This is a settled position in I.H.L doctrine.

However, Adj's military forces are now parties to the N.I.A.C and bound by C.A.3 and customary N.I.A.C rules.

J.A's I.A.C claim: Legally unsound. An N.S.A.G cannot unilaterally elevate a conflict to I.A.C status. I.A.C classification requires inter-state armed force. J.A's political motivation is clear: I.A.C status would theoretically confer combatant privilege and P.O.W status on its fighters. The I.C.R.C's response is to explain the legal framework while affirming that J.A fighters and detainees retain C.A.3 protections regardless of classification.

Your J.2 analytical note: Assess whether Adj's air strike pattern suggests targeting of military objectives only, or whether civilian infrastructure is being struck — a conduct-of-hostilities issue separate from classification but operationally linked.

Situation B — Liwa Al-Qibla's Shifting Presence

Liwa Al-Qibla (L.Q) has been conducting sporadic attacks across three eastern governorates for 18 months. It has no fixed headquarters, controls no territory, and operates in cells of 15 to 40 fighters. L.Q's leadership structure is unclear: there are two commanders who have each claimed authority in recent statements. L.Q does not have a formal political wing and has never participated in peace negotiations. In the past week, L.Q conducted two coordinated simultaneous attacks on I.L.G military checkpoints in different governorates, using I.E.D's and small arms, killing 23 soldiers.

Discussion Questions

7. Does L.Q meet the organization threshold for N.I.A.C classification? Assess against the Haradinaj indicators.

8. Does the intensity of L.Q's violence over 18 months meet the N.I.A.C intensity threshold? What factors support and undermine this conclusion?

9. If you conclude that L.Q does not (yet) meet both thresholds, what legal framework governs the I.L.G's response to L.Q, and what implications does this have for I.C.R.C engagement?

Discussion Notes — Situation B

Organization analysis: L.Q presents a genuinely borderline case — exactly the type the I.C.R.C encounters in practice. Factors supporting organization: coordinated simultaneous attacks across governorates require operational planning; 18-month operational continuity implies some logistical capacity; two commanders suggest command exists even if disputed. Factors undermining organization: contested leadership creates accountability gaps; no territorial control; no political representation; cell structure without confirmed integration.

Intensity analysis: 18 months of attacks on military checkpoints, 23 soldiers killed in coordinated operations. Factors supporting threshold met: duration (18 months), military targets, coordinated tactics, scale of casualties. Factors undermining: sporadic rather than sustained; cell sizes small; no heavy weapons recorded.

I.C.R.C approach when threshold uncertain: The I.C.R.C would likely engage the I.L.G on the basis of applicable rules regardless of classification — emphasizing that even if I.H.L does not apply, human rights law (I.H.R.L) governs and minimum humane treatment standards apply to all persons. The I.C.R.C would monitor the situation for threshold evolution and engage L.Q through available channels if access is possible.

Your J.2 note: Order-of-battle assessment of L.Q would be the decisive analytical product here. Command hierarchy, logistics nodes, communication patterns — exactly what you would have produced in J.2 work. This is directly transferable to I.C.R.C classification analysis.

Situation C — The Deportation Convoy

I.L.G forces have stopped a civilian convoy in the southern city of Al-Rahbah attempting to flee northward. I.L.G military police have detained 340 civilians, identifying 28 as “suspected J.A sympathizers” based on family names and mobile phone content. The I.L.G Minister of Interior states publicly that this is a “law enforcement operation” under anti-terrorism legislation, not a military operation, and that I.H.L does not apply.

The 28 suspects are to be transferred to a detention facility 400 kilometers away in the capital without judicial proceedings. The remaining 312 civilians are to be “relocated” to a government-controlled camp.

Discussion Questions

10. Does I.H.L apply to the I.L.G's handling of the 28 suspects? Does the I.L.G's "law enforcement" characterization change this?

11. What specific I.H.L and I.H.R.L provisions apply to the detention of the 28 suspects? What I.C.R.C protections should you immediately assert?

12. Assess the “relocation” of 312 civilians under I.H.L. What legal prohibition may be engaged?

Discussion Notes — Situation C

I.H.L applicability: The I.L.G's law enforcement characterization is not determinative. Because a N.I.A.C exists between the I.L.G and J.A (established in the scenario), I.H.L applies to all conduct of the I.L.G in connection with that conflict — including detention operations. The operational label 'law enforcement' does not remove I.H.L obligations when the detention is conflict-related.

Detention protections: C.A.3 requires humane treatment and prohibition of violence, hostage-taking, degrading treatment, and sentences without regular judicial procedure. Customary I.H.L Rule 99 (I.C.R.C Study) prohibits arbitrary deprivation of liberty. I.H.R.L applies simultaneously (I.C.C.P.R Art. 9 — arbitrary detention prohibited). I.C.R.C should immediately assert: right of access to all detainees, individual case recording, monitoring of transfer conditions, and assessment of judicial procedure.

Civilian relocation: Forcible displacement of civilians is prohibited under customary I.H.L Rule 129 (N.I.A.C). If motivated by discriminatory grounds (family name), it may engage prohibition on collective punishment (C.A.3, customary I.H.L Rule 103). Transferring 312 civilians to a government camp against their will constitutes forcible displacement. The I.C.R.C should document, protest, and seek immediate cessation.

Delegation note: This scenario directly parallels situations encountered in Darfur (unamid) and the West Bank. Your field experience with population displacement and detention monitoring is immediately applicable.

Work through each question independently before reviewing the answer. These questions reflect the level and style of analysis required in I.C.R.C delegation interviews and operational settings.

Q.1. What is the minimum threshold for an I.A.C under Common Article 2?

Answer Any use of armed force between two or more High Contracting Parties (states). No minimum level of intensity is required. Even a single border incident involving state forces can constitute an I.A.C. The conflict does not require a formal declaration of war. Even if one party denies the existence of a conflict, C.A.2 still applies. Hint: The contrast with N.I.A.C — where intensity and organization thresholds must both be met — is a frequently tested distinction.

Q.2. State the two cumulative thresholds that must be met for N.I.A.C classification.

Answer

(1) Minimum level of intensity: the armed violence must be protracted and beyond sporadic incidents, riots, or acts of banditry. (2) Minimum degree of organization of the non-state party: the N.S.A.G must be sufficiently organized to be capable of sustained military operations and to be held responsible for compliance with I.H.L. Both thresholds must be met simultaneously. Meeting only one is insufficient for N.I.A.C classification. Hint: In I.C.R.C delegation contexts, state authorities will often challenge one or both thresholds to avoid I.H.L obligations.

Q.3. Can an Armed Conflict be Simultaneously Classified as an I.A.C and a N.I.A.C?

Yes. This is not only legally possible but factually common in contemporary conflicts (Yemen, Syria, Libya). Within a single territory, there may be an I.A.C between states and a concurrent N.I.A.C between a state and an N.S.A.G or between N.S.A.G's. Each legal relationship is assessed independently and attracts its own applicable legal framework. The I.C.R.C engages each relationship separately and applies the appropriate rules to each. Hint: Identify the parties in each dyad. Each dyad has its own classification.

Q.4. An armed group calls itself a “liberation movement” and demands combatant status under A.P I Art. 1(4). Under what conditions could this be valid?

A.P I Art. 1 (4) extends I.A.C rules to armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation, or racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination. For this to apply: (a) the conflict must objectively meet one of these three criteria; (b) the authority representing the people must have declared acceptance of the Geneva Conventions and A.P I; (c) the state party to the conflict must have ratified A.P I. This provision is controversial and rarely successfully invoked. Hint: Many N.S.A.G's use this framing politically. The legal bar is high and procedural requirements are precise.

Q.5. Why does the I.C.R.C engage N.S.A.G's even in conflicts classified as N.I.A.C's where fighters have no combatant privilege?

Answer

Because C.A.3 and customary I.H.L bind all parties to a N.I.A.C, including N.S.A.G's, regardless of their legal status. The I.C.R.C's mandate is to ensure compliance with I.H.L by all parties. Engagement with N.S.A.G's is essential to: protecting civilians and detainees under N.S.A.G control; promoting I.H.L compliance and reducing violations; securing I.C.R.C access to conflict-affected populations; building institutional relationships that support humanitarian operations. The I.C.R.C's engagement does not imply recognition of the N.S.A.G's political legitimacy or legal status. Hint: This distinction — engagement versus recognition — is operationally critical and frequently misunderstood by state interlocutors.

Q.6. What is the legal effect of a state declaring a counter-terrorism emergency on I.H.L applicability?

None, if the factual thresholds for armed conflict are met. I.H.L applies as a matter of fact, not political declaration. A counter-terrorism emergency declaration does not suspend I.H.L, nor does designation of an armed group as a terrorist organization. I.H.L and I.H.R.L apply concurrently during armed conflict; emergency measures under I.H.R.L do not derogate from I.H.L obligations. The I.C.R.C consistently challenges the use of counter-terrorism frameworks to exclude I.H.L applicability. Hint: The I.C.R.C's paper on I.H.L and terrorism is essential reading for this point.

Q.7. What distinguishes A.P 2 from Common Article 3 in terms of applicability?

Answer

C.A.3 applies to all N.I.A.C's regardless of intensity level (beyond the N.I.A.C threshold) and regardless of N.S.A.G organizational capacity beyond the minimum required for N.I.A.C classification. A.P 2 requires a higher threshold: the N.S.A.G must exercise territorial control sufficient to enable sustained and concerted military operations and to implement the Protocol. A.P 2 applies only in conflicts between state armed forces and N.S.A.G's (not inter-N.S.A.G conflicts). Many N.I.A.C's are governed by C.A.3 and customary I.H.L but not A.P 2. Hint: A.P 2's territorial control requirement is the key distinguishing threshold.

Q.8. You are presenting the I.C.R.C's classification analysis to a senior military officer who insists that the conflict is merely a “criminal insurgency” below the I.H.L threshold. How do you respond?

Answer

Present the factual indicators methodically: intensity (duration, scale of operations, weapons used, casualties, displacement, government military response, U.N.S.C attention); organization (command structure, territorial presence, ability to plan operations, political communication). Explain that the legal determination is based on facts, not political characterizations. Cite the Tadic standard and the I.C.T.Y's authoritative position. Make clear that the I.C.R.C's classification is independent and does not require state agreement. Affirm that the I.C.R.C's engagement protects the state's interests too: I.H.L compliance reduces reputational risk, improves operational discipline, and facilitates eventual peace processes. Hint: Frame your argument in terms of the officer's institutional interests. Challenge the characterization without confrontation. Maintain the I.C.R.C's independence while demonstrating analytical rigor.

Part 6 — Daily Study Plan, Readings, and Week 4 Preview

6.1 Seven-Day Study Plan (9 to 11 Hours Total)

Table summary: The table outlines a daily study schedule focused on International Humanitarian Law frameworks, progressing from core definitions and thresholds to primary sources, regional conflict applications, and practical scenario analysis, concluding with self-assessment and a consolidation exercise.

13. I.C.R.C, How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law? Opinion Paper, March 2008. Available: icrc dot org U.R.L

14. I.C.T.Y, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, October 1995, paras 562 to 568 (N.I.A.C definition). Available: icty dot org U.R.L

15. Geneva Conventions, Common Articles 2 and 3 (primary text). Available: icrc dot org U.R.L

Tier 2 — Recommended (Complete by Day 5)

I.C.T.Y, Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Trial Chamber, Judgment, April 2008 — organization indicators section. Available: icty dot org U.R.L

17. I.C.R.C, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Report to International Conference of the Red Cross, 2019. Available: icrc dot org U.R.L

Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford, 2012), Chapter 3: Classification. [Library access]

Tier 3 — Supplementary (Week 3 to 4 Reading Period)

Nils Melzer, International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction, Chapter 3. Available: icrc dot org U.R.L

I.C.R.C, I.H.L and Terrorism: Frequently Asked. Available: icrc dot org U.R.L

U.N Security Council Resolutions on Yemen (2216, 2342, 2564) — review classification language and humanitarian mandate provisions.

Arabic-Language Resource

22. Arabic text:Available in Arabic at icrc dot org U.R.L — review the conflict classification chapter in Arabic to build bilingual legal vocabulary.

6.3 Key Terms Reference

Table summary: This table provides a glossary of key legal terms related to armed conflicts, offering their full definitions and corresponding translations in Arabic.

Table summary: This table provides a glossary of key international humanitarian law terms, offering their formal definitions and corresponding Arabic translations.

6.4 Week 4 Preview — Principles of Distinction and Military Objectives

Coming in Week 4

Week 4 enters the conduct of hostilities. Building on the I.A.C/N.I.A.C framework established this week, you will study:

• The principle of distinction: combatants versus civilians; military objectives versus civilian objects

• The direct participation in hostilities (D.P.H) threshold: when does a civilian lose protection?

• Defining military objectives under A.P I Art. 52 (2) — the two-part nature-or-use test

• Proportionality in attack: the incidental civilian harm assessment

• Precautionary measures in attack and target verification obligations

• Scenario: A strike planning scenario in a mee-nah urban environment with dual-use infrastructure

Preparation: Review A.P I Articles 48 to 58 before Week 4. Note how these rules apply differently in I.A.C versus N.I.A.C context — linking directly to this week's classification framework.

I.C.R.C Non-State Armed Groups Delegation Preparation Programme 2027 Week 2

Classification of Armed Conflicts

I.A.C versus N.I.A.C — Legal Thresholds, Applicable Law, and mee-nah Applications Estimated Study Time: 7 to 8 hours

Week 2 Learning Objectives

• Distinguish I.A.C from N.I.A.C with precision

- Apply the Tadić threshold test to real cases

• Identify which I.H.L rules apply to each conflict type

- Analyse conflicts with multiple parties (mixed conflicts)

- Apply classification to mee-nah conflicts you have operated in

Weekly Programme

1. Part 1: Core Theory & Legal Framework

2. Part 2: Deeper Legal Analysis & Comparison Tables

3. Part 3: Key Thresholds & Real Case Examples

4. Part 4: Weekly Scenario (mee-nah-based)

5. Part 5: 8 Self-Assessment Q&A

6. Part 6: Daily Study Plan & Week 3 Preview

Faysal's field note: You have operated inside I.A.C's (I.S.A.F/Afghanistan — state party v. state party with non-state actors), N.I.A.C's (unamid/Darfur — government v. J.E.M/S.L.M), and complex mixed conflicts (West Bank — occupation law + N.I.A.C elements). Week 2 gives you the legal vocabulary to name and analyse what you already lived.

1.1 Why Classification Matters

The most fundamental question in I.H.L — before any rule applies, you must know what type of conflict you are in Classification of armed conflict is the gateway question of I.H.L. Every subsequent legal determination — which rules apply, what protections attach, what obligations bind parties — flows from answering correctly: is this an I.A.C or a N.I.A.C?

This is not a bureaucratic exercise. In practice, misclassifying a conflict can mean:

• Denying P.O.W status to fighters who are entitled to it (I.A.C rule, not N.I.A.C)

• Failing to apply the full Geneva Convention protections to wounded, sick, or shipwrecked

• Wrongly applying occupation law — or wrongly ignoring it

• Treating a Common Article 3 conflict as if it were governed by the full conventions (it is not)

• Prosecuting fighters as criminals rather than treating them as combatants

★ I.C.R.C Relevance: In N.S.A.G negotiations and delegation work, classification determines who the I.C.R.C can engage with legally, under which framework, and what it can ask N.S.A.G parties to commit to. This is directly relevant to your March 2027 work.

1.2 International Armed Conflict (I.A.C)

Geneva Conventions Common Article 2 — the primary definition Definition: An I.A.C exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between two or more States (High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions).

Art. Article 2 common to all four:'The present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them.'

Key features of I.A.C classification:

• Applies regardless of whether war is formally declared

• Applies even if one state denies there is a conflict

• Applies even if fighting is limited or brief — there is no minimum intensity threshold for I.A.C

• Applies to all territory of the belligerent states, not just where fighting occurs

• Occupation is treated as I.A.C even without active hostilities (Art. 2 para 2)

I.A.C also includes: Wars of national liberation — armed conflicts in which peoples fight against colonial domination, alien occupation, or racist regimes — under Protocol I Additional. This was controversial at adoption in 1977 and remains so.

Faysal's I.S.A.F context: Afghanistan presented classification complexity. The initial 2001 invasion (U.S/Coalition v. Taliban-controlled Afghan state) was clearly I.A.C. After the fall of the Taliban government, the conflict evolved. Fighting against Al-Qaeda as a non-state actor was arguably N.I.A.C. This dual-layer classification — I.A.C and N.I.A.C simultaneously — was genuinely contested among states and scholars during your deployment.

1.3 Non-International Armed Conflict (N.I.A.C)

Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 2 — two thresholds A N.I.A.C is an armed conflict that does not involve two or more states as parties. It occurs between a state and one or more non-state armed groups, or between non-state armed groups themselves.

There are Two levels of N.I.A.C in treaty law, with different legal thresholds:

Table summary: This table compares the legal frameworks of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II in non-international armed conflicts, showing that Additional Protocol II has a higher threshold for application, requires more stringent territorial control by armed groups, and provides more comprehensive minimum rules and protections than Common Article 3.

Practice point: Common Article 3 is sometimes called 'a convention in miniature' — it sets the absolute minimum. Customary I.H.L has expanded far beyond C.A.3 for N.I.A.C's, but C.A.3 remains the treaty floor. In your N.S.A.G delegation work, C.A.3 is your baseline legal anchor.

1.4 The Key Legal Gap: Why Classification Is Contested

Treaty I.H.L was built around state-to-state wars (I.A.C). N.I.A.C's were politically sensitive — states did not want to 'legitimise' armed groups by applying the same law. The result:

• I.A.C has four full Geneva Conventions + Additional Protocol I — comprehensive rules

- N.I.A.C has only Common Article 3 (16 lines) + Additional Protocol 2 (where ratified)

• The gap is partially filled by customary I.H.L — but customary law is harder to enforce

• Many states still contest what rules apply to N.I.A.C's, including who qualifies as an 'organised armed group'

For your N.S.A.G delegation work: this gap is exactly why the I.C.R.C engages N.S.A.G's — to persuade them to commit to humanitarian norms even where treaty obligations are ambiguous.

Part 2 — Deeper Legal Analysis and Comparison Tables

2.1 The Tadić Threshold Test for N.I.A.C

I.C.T.Y, Prosecutor v. Tadić, 1995 — the foundational legal standard The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (I.C.T.Y) in the Tadić case established the two-part test now universally used to determine whether a N.I.A.C exists:

Table summary: The table outlines the indicators used to determine if a conflict qualifies as a non-international armed conflict based on intensity and organization, providing a specific example from the Darfur conflict to illustrate how these criteria are applied in practice.

2.2 I.A.C versus N.I.A.C — Full Comparison of Applicable Law

Table summary: The table compares legal protections in international armed conflicts versus non-international armed conflicts, highlighting that international conflicts provide more comprehensive formal statuses, such as combatant and prisoner of war designations, while non-international conflicts rely on more limited treaty bases and customary law to ensure humane treatment and civilian protection.

Table summary: The table compares the legal frameworks of international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts, showing that while core humanitarian principles such as proportionality, distinction, and precautions are consistently applied across both, significant differences exist regarding occupation law, the repatriation of prisoners, and the specific legal regimes for grave breaches.

2.3 Special Categories — The Hard Cases

Several conflict types resist easy classification. The I.C.R.C has developed positions on each:

Table summary: The table outlines various complex conflict types, detailing their descriptions, legal classifications, and the resulting legal consequences, highlighting how different scenarios lead to the application of either international or non-international armed conflict laws.

Faysal's West Bank context: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most legally complex classifications. The West Bank is generally classified as belligerent occupation (I.A.C/G.C 4). Gaza post-2005 — contested. Operations inside Gaza that involve Israeli armed forces fighting Hamas are often analysed as N.I.A.C (Hamas as organised armed group) within the broader I.A.C/occupation framework. This is exactly the kind of layered analysis the I.C.R.C delegation navigates daily.

Part 3 — Key Thresholds and Real Conflict Examples from mee-nah and Your Missions

3.1 The Classification Decision Tree

Apply this in sequence for any conflict

- Step 1 Is there armed force being used? (fighting, not mere tension or riots) If no to no armed conflict. I.H.L does not apply. Domestic law / human rights law applies.

Step 2

Step 3

Image summary: This figure is a text-based graphic. It contains the phrase Step 4 centered at the top. The image indicates a specific stage within a sequential process, signifying that this is the fourth phase of a series of instructions or a workflow.

Step 4

Step 5

- Are Two or more States parties to the fighting? If Yes to I.A.C. Apply full Geneva Conventions + A.P I. Stop here.

- Is one or more party a non-state armed group? Does it meet the Tadić test (intensity + organisation)?

- If Yes to N.I.A.C. Apply C.A.3 + customary I.H.L + A.P 2 (if applicable).

- If Yes, leads to possible internationalised N.I.A.C or parallel I.A.C. Assess each relationship separately.

- Does the state exercise effective control over territory of another state? If Yes to occupation law applies (G.C 4) in addition to other classification.

3.2 Your Four Missions — Classification Analysis

Faysal's operational experience through an I.H.L lens

Table summary: The table outlines key international humanitarian law issues and classifications for two different missions, contrasting the legal complexities of a conflict involving state and non-state actors in Afghanistan with a primarily internal conflict characterized by atrocity crimes and civilian protection challenges in Darfur.

Table summary: The table compares two different operational contexts, highlighting the legal complexities of conflict classification. It contrasts a situation in Haiti characterized by legal ambiguity between internal disturbances and non-international armed conflicts with the West Bank context, which involves a combination of belligerent occupation and active hostilities.

3.3 mee-nah Conflicts — Classification Quick Reference 2026

Table summary: This table outlines various conflicts across the Middle East and Sahel regions, categorizing them primarily as non-international armed conflicts with varying degrees of internationalization. It identifies the diverse array of state and non-state actors involved and highlights critical international humanitarian law challenges, which consistently center on civilian protection, proportionality in urban warfare, and the complexities of fragmented authority.

Part 4 — Weekly Scenario: The Al-Furat Valley Operation

Scenario Background

The Al-Furat Valley (a fictional composite drawing on Syria/Iraq dynamics) straddles the border between State A and State B. The Mujahideen Khalq Al-Furat (M.K.F) is a non-state armed group that controls approximately 3,000 kilometers squared of territory on both sides of the border, has an estimated 8,000 fighters under a hierarchical command, maintains a radio station, runs a basic court system, and issues passes for movement through its checkpoints. M.K.F has announced a 'caliphate' but this is not recognised by any state.

State A's armed forces have been conducting operations against M.K.F for 18 months. State B has conducted three airstrikes against M.K.F positions on its territory. A third state — State C (a regional power) — has provided artillery to State A under a formal bilateral military agreement. Last week, State C's military advisers were killed in an M.K.F ambush inside State A's territory. State C is now considering deploying ground troops.

Situation A: State A versus M.K.F — What Type of Conflict?

Situation:

State A's military has been fighting M.K.F for 18 months. M.K.F controls territory, has 8,000 fighters, a command structure, a court system, and a radio station. State A has deployed armoured brigades, conducted airstrikes, and established forward operating bases near M.K.F-held towns.

Questions for Analysis:

1. Apply the Tadić two-part test to this conflict. Does it meet the threshold for N.I.A.C?

2. Which body of I.H.L treaty law applies? Common Article 3 only, or also Additional Protocol 2?

3. M.K.F fighters captured during operations — what is their legal status? Can State A prosecute them under domestic law?

Discussion Notes:

This is a clear N.I.A.C: both intensity (18 months, armoured brigades, airstrikes, casualties) and organisation (command, territory, court system, radio) thresholds are met. C.A.3 applies as treaty minimum. A.P 2 likely applies if State A has ratified it and M.K.F exercises 'responsible command' and controls territory 'enabling sustained military operations.' Captured M.K.F fighters are not P.O.W's — they have no combatant privilege.

State A may prosecute under domestic law, but C.A.3 humane treatment and fair trial guarantees apply. I.C.R.C would seek access to detainees.

Situation B: State C Deploys Ground Troops — Does the Conflict Become an I.A.C?

Situation:

State C, after losing military advisers to an M.K.F ambush, deploys 2,000 ground troops into State A's territory under the bilateral agreement. State C forces now conduct joint operations with State A's military against M.K.F. State B objects and threatens military action against State C forces if they approach State B's border.

Questions for Analysis:

4. Does State C's deployment transform this N.I.A.C into an I.A.C or create a parallel I.A.C?

5. If State C forces and State B forces exchange fire across the border, what is the classification of that engagement?

6. How does the Overall Control test (Tadić) versus Effective Control test (Nicaragua) affect analysis of State C's involvement?

Discussion Notes:

State C deploying alongside State A against M.K.F does not create an I.A.C — both states are fighting the same N.S.A.G. This remains a N.I.A.C, potentially an internationalised N.I.A.C. However: if State C and State B armed forces exchange fire, that engagement is a separate I.A.C (two states). The Effective Control test (Nicaragua/I.C.J) requires State C to have directed specific operations to attribute M.K.F acts to State C. The Overall Control test (Tadi/I.C.T.Y) requires only general control of the group. The I.C.R.C leans toward Overall Control for the purpose of classification. The practical result: multiple legal frameworks apply simultaneously — N.I.A.C (State A & C v. M.K.F), potential I.A.C (State C v. State B if fighting erupts).

Situation C: M.K.F Holds Civilian Hostages and Controls a Hospital

Situation:

M.K.F detains 47 civilian aid workers from three international N.G.O's working in the Al-Furat Valley. M.K.F commanders claim these detainees are 'spies' and will be tried by the M.K.F court. Meanwhile, M.K.F has converted the main district hospital into a command post and weapons storage facility. State A's air force is planning a strike on the hospital.

Questions for Analysis:

7. Under C.A.3, what obligations does M.K.F have toward the detained aid workers?

8. Does the conversion of the hospital into a military use lose it protected status under I.H.L? What conditions must be met for State A to lawfully strike?

9. As a former military intelligence officer: what would your targeting process have required before recommending this strike in your I.S.A.F context?

Discussion Notes:

C.A 3 obligations for M.K.F: humane treatment, no torture, no summary execution, judicial guarantees for any trial. N.G.O aid workers are clearly civilians — their detention is likely unlawful hostage-taking, prohibited under customary Rule 96. Hospital: I.H.L protects medical facilities. Protection is lost when used to commit'acts harmful to the enemy' outside their humanitarian function — storing weapons qualifies. But: State A must give warning and reasonable time to comply before striking. Proportionality: civilian harm must not be excessive relative to military advantage. In I.S.A.F targeting: legal adviser sign-off, collateral damage estimate, R.O.E authority level, pattern-of-life intelligence requirement — all applied before any such strike.

Part 5 — Self-Assessment: 8 Questions with Answers and Hints

Test yourself before reading the answers. Cover the Answer and Hint sections. Time yourself: aim for no more than 3 minutes per question in a real assessment.

Q.1: What is the Primary Treaty Provision that Defines I.A.C, and What are its Key Elements?

Answer:

Common Article 2 common to all four. Key elements: (1) resort to armed force; (2) between two or more High Contracting Parties (states). There is no minimum intensity threshold for I.A.C — even a brief border incident constitutes an I.A.C if between two states. Formal declaration of war is not required, and even if one state denies the conflict exists, C.A 2 still applies.

Hint: Remember the three 'no requirements' of I.A.C: no declaration, no minimum duration, no minimum intensity.

Q.2: Explain the Tadić two-part test. What are the two criteria and what indicators establish each?

Answer:

The Tadić test establishes that a N.I.A.C exists when armed violence meets two criteria: (1) Intensity — assessed by indicators including collective nature of violence, duration, spread, weapons used, casualties, displacement, government military response, international attention. (2) Organisation of the armed group — assessed by command structure, ability to sustain military operations, capacity to recruit/train, internal discipline, territorial control, ability to negotiate. Both criteria must be met. The test is applied on the facts, not on formal declarations.

Hint: Tadić = Intensity + Organisation. Neither alone is sufficient.

Q.3: What is the legal status of a captured N.I.A.C fighter? Compare to an I.A.C fighter.

Answer:

In I.A.C: a lawful combatant (meeting criteria of A.P I Art. 43 to 44) has combatant privilege — the right to participate in hostilities — and upon capture is a Prisoner of War under G.C 3, protected from prosecution for lawful acts of war, entitled to full P.O.W protections until end of hostilities. In N.I.A.C: there is no equivalent combatant status. N.I.A.C fighters have no combatant privilege and can be prosecuted under domestic law for taking up arms. However, C.A.3 minimum guarantees apply: humane treatment, no torture, judicial guarantees. Customary I.H.L also provides protections. The I.C.R.C advocates for equivalent protections in practice.

Hint: I.A.C fighter = combatant privilege + P.O.W status. N.I.A.C fighter = domestic law prosecution + C.A.3 minimum protections.

Q.4: What is an 'Internationalised N.I.A.C' and give one mee-nah example?

An internationalised N.I.A.C occurs when a N.I.A.C involves the direct military intervention of a foreign state. The conflict retains its N.I.A.C character for the original parties (state v. N.S.A.G) but the intervention may create a parallel I.A.C if the intervening state's forces engage another state's forces. Example: Syria. The Syrian civil war began as a N.I.A.C (Syrian government v. armed opposition groups).

Russian military intervention (from 2015) on behalf of the government, combined with U.S-led coalition airstrikes against Isis and support for S.D.F, created multiple internationalised dimensions. When Turkish and Syrian government forces exchanged fire, a potential I.A.C element arose. The legal analysis requires assessing each state-to-state and state-to-N.S.A.G relationship separately.

Hint: Internationalised = N.I.A.C with foreign state military involvement. Each relationship assessed separately.

Table summary: The table explains that international humanitarian law applies to peacekeeping forces like UNAMID and ISAF when they act as combatants or conduct enforcement operations, noting that obligations can vary based on the specific conflict classification and the differing legal commitments of contributing states.

Q.6: What is the difference between a 'grave breach' of the Geneva Conventions and a 'war crime' under the Rome Statute? Why does classification matter?

Answer:

Grave breaches (G.C I Art. 50, G.C 2 Art. 51, G.C 3 Art. 130, G.C 4 Art. 147 + A.P I Art. 85) are the most serious violations of I.H.L in I.A.C. They create obligations on states to search for, prosecute or extradite persons responsible — universal jurisdiction. Grave breaches only apply in I.A.C. War crimes under the Rome Statute (Art. 8) cover both I.A.C and N.I.A.C violations and can be prosecuted by the I.C.C. Classification therefore determines: which violations constitute 'grave breaches' (I.A.C only), what individual criminal accountability mechanism applies, and what state obligations arise. In a N.I.A.C, there are no grave breaches — only war crimes under customary / Rome Statute frameworks.

Hint: Grave breaches = I.A.C only, treaty obligation, universal jurisdiction. War crimes = both I.A.C and N.I.A.C, Rome Statute.

Q.7: In your unamid/Darfur context: Was the conflict in Darfur from 2003 an I.A.C or N.I.A.C? What was the legal basis for I.C.R.C operations there?

Answer:

Darfur was a N.I.A.C from 2003: the Sudanese state (S.A.F + Janjaweed/R.S.F) v. non-state armed groups (J.E.M — Justice and Equality Movement, S.L.M/A — Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and factions). Both Tadić criteria were met: intensity (mass atrocities, over 300,000 deaths estimated, 2+ million displaced) and organisation (J.E.M had command structure, controlled territory in western Darfur, negotiated with A.U, had political-military leadership). Not an I.A.C because Chad's limited involvement did not meet the threshold of direct state-to-state armed conflict. I.C.R.C operations were based on: (1) C.A 3 —'impartial humanitarian body such as I.C.R.C may offer its services'; (2) I.C.R.C's mandate under the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; (3) Customary I.H.L. I.C.R.C engaged all parties including J.E.M and S.L.M on humanitarian access.

Hint: Darfur = N.I.A.C. I.C.R.C access under C.A.3 'may offer its services' — not a right but an offer states/N.S.A.G's cannot unreasonably refuse.

Q.8: Your I.C.R.C N.S.A.G delegation will engage a non-state armed group. Which I.H.L framework governs your interaction and what can you ask them to commit to?

The legal framework is C.A 3 (binding minimum) plus customary I.H.L rules applicable to N.I.A.C's. The I.C.R.C approach: while N.S.A.G's cannot sign treaties, they can make unilateral commitments or sign deeds of commitment (Geneva Call). The I.C.R.C can ask them to: commit to respecting C.A.3 minimum guarantees (humane treatment, no torture, judicial guarantees, care for wounded); allow I.C.R.C access to detainees and conflict-affected populations; distinguish between civilians and fighters in their operations; refrain from using prohibited weapons; accept I.C.R.C medical and humanitarian activities. Key challenge: N.S.A.G's often reject 'I.H.L language' as implying acceptance of state authority — the I.C.R.C uses humanitarian framing ('rules of war', 'protection of your own community') rather than legal framing in initial engagement.

Hint: C.A.3 + customary I.H.L = the framework. I.C.R.C asks for humanitarian commitments, not treaty ratification. Framing matters.

Part 6 — Daily Study Plan, Readings, and Week 3 Preview

6.1 7 Day Study Plan for Week 2

Total estimated time: 7 to 8 hours

Table summary: The table outlines a weekly study plan that progressively increases in time commitment and complexity, moving from theoretical reading and comparison exercises to practical scenario applications and self-assessment, concluding with language-specific study and a final review.

6.2 Recommended Readings for Week 2

Primary (Essential — read in full):

- Common Article 2 — text of all four Geneva Conventions 1949 (2 pages). Available: I.C.R.C dot org U.R.L

- Common Article 3 — text of all four Geneva Conventions 1949 (1 page). Available: I.C.R.C dot org U.R.L

- I.C.T.Y, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, paras. 562 to 568 (Tadić test). Available: I.C.T.Y online

- I.C.R.C, 'How is the Term Armed Conflict Defined in International Humanitarian Law?' Opinion Paper, 2008 (8 pages). Available: I.C.R.C dot org U.R.L — most practical summary in existence

Secondary (Strongly Recommended):

• I.C.R.C Customary I.H.L Study 2005 — Introduction and Rules 1, 14, 15 (free online: ihl-databases dot icrc dot org U.R.L)

- Nils Melzer,'International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive — Chapter 3: Classification of Armed Conflicts. Free P.D.F: I.C.R.C dot org U.R.L

- I.C.R.C,'International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts' — Report to the 31st International Conference of the Red. Section on classification challenges.

Arabic Language:

- I.C.R.C dot org U.R.L — search Arabic text (Classification of armed conflicts) — multiple Arabic resources available

• Al-Arabiya / B.B.C Arabic analysis of Yemen, Syria conflict law — useful for contemporary mee-nah examples

6.3 Key Terms — English and Arabic

For your N.S.A.G delegation preparation

Table summary: This table provides a glossary of key legal terms related to armed conflict and international humanitarian law, offering their corresponding translations in Arabic along with phonetic transliterations.

6.4 Week 3 Preview — Conduct of Hostilities (Advanced)

Week 3: Conduct of Hostilities — Advanced Framework

Building on Week 1's introduction to conduct of hostilities principles, Week 3 goes deeper into:

- The principle of distinction in detail: civilians versus combatants, civilian objects versus military objectives

- Direct participation in hostilities (D.P.H): the revolving door problem — civilians who take part in fighting

• Proportionality analysis: how military advantage is assessed versus expected civilian harm

- Precautionary measures: what commanders are legally required to do before attacking

• Targeting of dual-use objects: bridges, roads, power stations in mee-nah conflicts

- N.S.A.G application: how these rules apply to non-state actors in your delegation context

• Scenario: A drone strike in a populated area — legal framework for decision-making

Preparation for Week 3: Re-read A.P I Arts. 48 to 58 (principles of distinction, proportionality, precautions) and I.C.R.C Customary Rules 1 to 24. Estimated study time: 8 to 9 hours.

Week 2 Completion Checklist

- I can define I.A.C and N.I.A.C without notes

- I can apply the Tadić test to a new conflict scenario

- I can explain which I.H.L rules apply to each conflict type

- I have analysed at least one current mee-nah conflict using the Decision Tree

- I have completed all 8 self-assessment questions

- I have reviewed all Arabic legal terms in Section 6.3

- I have read the I.C.R.C Opinion Paper on armed conflict definition

- I am ready for Week 3 — Conduct of Hostilities (Advanced)

Good work, Faysal. Classification is the foundation. Everything in your N.S.A.G delegation work depends on getting this right.

I.C.R.C | Non-State Armed Groups Delegation March 2027 Preparation Program

Week 1 of 52 Foundations of I.H.L and the I.C.R.C

Table summary: The table outlines the educational focus for the current week, centering on the foundational legal and moral principles of International Humanitarian Law. It details the learning objectives, core themes including the Geneva Conventions and humanitarian principles, a practical urban combat scenario involving non-state armed groups, and a preview of the following week's focus on conflict classification.

how to use this Document: Read each section actively — pause after each Key Point and test yourself. Do the self-assessment questions without looking at the hints first. Study the scenario and write your own analysis before reading the discussion. Estimated time: 4 to 5 hours.

Part 1 — What Is International Humanitarian Law? The Legal Framework You Will Represent in Every N.S.A.G Dialogue

1.1 Definition and Purpose

International Humanitarian Law (I.H.L) — also called the Law of Armed Conflict (L.O.A.C) or the Laws of War — is the branch of international law that regulates the conduct of armed conflict. Its core purpose is to limit the suffering caused by war by protecting those who are not or are no longer participating in hostilities, and by restricting the means and methods of warfare available to belligerents.

Critical I.H.L does not address whether a war is legal or illegal — that is governed by the U.N Charter (jus ad bellum). I.H.L applies equally to all parties in a conflict, regardless of who started it or who is 'right'. This equal application is foundational to your dialogue with N.S.A.G's.

1.2 The Two Pillars of I.H.L

Pillar 1: Geneva Law

• Protects persons who are not or no longer taking part in hostilities

• Wounded and sick combatants on land (G.C.I)

• Wounded, sick, shipwrecked at sea (G.C 2)

- Prisoners of War (G.C 3)

- Civilians under enemy power (G.C 4)

• Additional Protocols 1, Two,

Core principle: Humanity

Pillar 2: Hague Law

- Regulates the means and methods of warfare

- Prohibits weapons causing unnecessary suffering

• Rules on targeting — distinction, proportionality

• Precautions in attack

• Cultural property protection

• Conduct of hostilities in all environments

Core principle: Military Necessity

1.3 Sources of I.H.L — Know These Cold

Table summary: The table outlines key international humanitarian law treaties, highlighting that the Geneva Conventions have the broadest global adoption and provide the most fundamental basis for dialogue with non-state armed groups, while the Additional Protocols offer specialized protections with varying levels of ratification and applicability based on the nature of the conflict.

Table summary: The table distinguishes between customary international humanitarian law, which consists of unwritten rules binding on all parties including non-state armed groups, and various specific treaties that regulate particular weapons and legal frameworks.

1.4 Common Article 3 — Memorize This

Why It Matters

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is the cornerstone of your N.S.A.G work. It is the minimum standard that applies to all parties in a non-international armed conflict — including N.S.A.G's — regardless of their legal status or whether they have signed any treaty. In your delegation, every N.S.A.G commander you meet is bound by it.

Common Article 3 requires all parties to a N.I.A.C to treat humanely, without adverse distinction, all persons not taking active part in hostilities. It specifically prohibits:

• Violence to life and person — murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, torture

Taking of hostages

• Outrages upon personal dignity — humiliating or degrading treatment

• Passing of sentences and executions without due process guarantees

It also requires: collection and care of the wounded and sick. And it explicitly invites parties to bring into force its provisions through special agreements.

Part 2 — The I.C.R.C: Mandate, Principles, and N.S.A.G Dialogue

Understanding your own organization before you represent it

2.1 The I.C.R.C's Mandate and Unique Legal Status

The I.C.R.C is a private organization under Swiss law, founded in 1863 by Henry Dunant following the Battle of Solferino. It has a unique mandate formally recognized in the Geneva Conventions: to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other violence, and to provide them with assistance.

What Makes the I.C.R.C Unique:

- Only humanitarian organization explicitly named in the Geneva Conventions

• Recognized right of initiative — can offer services to parties in any conflict

- Guardian and promoter of I.H.L — not just a user of it

- Neutral intermediary role — facilitates dialogue, prisoner releases, hostage negotiations

• Conducts confidential bilateral dialogue — does not publicly name violators by default

- Present in 100+ countries; access to places no other org can reach

I.C.R.C 2024 to 2027 Strategy Priorities:

• Strengthening protection activities

• Expanding dialogue with both States and N.S.A.G's

• Ensuring fulfillment of I.H.L obligations

Addressing new technologies in warfare (autonomous weapons, cyber, A.I)

• Neutral intermediary role — hostage/detainee releases

• Localization and decolonization of humanitarian action

2.2 The Seven Fundamental Principles — Know All Seven

Table summary: This table outlines the core guiding principles of the Movement, detailing how each principle functions as an operational tool to ensure unbiased humanitarian action, maintain access to conflicting parties, and preserve autonomy from external political or military influences.

Table summary: The table defines the core principles of Unity and Universality, highlighting how the organizational structure and global reach of the Movement establish legitimacy and clarity when engaging with various stakeholders.

2.3 Why N.S.A.G's and Why It Matters for Faysal

The I.C.R.C's engagement with Non-State Armed Groups (N.S.A.G's) is one of its most operationally complex and legally sensitive activities. N.S.A.G's are not party to the Geneva Conventions as such — only States sign treaties. Yet customary I.H.L and Common Article 3 bind them. The I.C.R.C must engage them to protect victims on all sides.

Your Edge

Your I.S.A.F/Afghanistan experience is directly relevant here. You have seen first-hand what happens when armed groups do — and do not — respect I.H.L. In your I.C.R.C delegation, you will translate that operational credibility into dialogue. N.S.A.G's respect former military officers who have 'been there'. That is your edge.

Part 3 — Core I.H.L Principles in Conduct of Hostilities The rules that govern how fighting may be conducted

3.1 The Four Foundational Principles of Conduct of Hostilities

Distinction

Parties must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives. Only military objectives may be attacked. This is the most violated principle by N.S.A.G's.

Scenario

A N.S.A.G fires mortars from a residential neighborhood at an army checkpoint. Civilians live in the buildings they fire from. Question: Does firing from a civilian area make those civilians lawful targets? Does it make the N.S.A.G fighters lawful targets? What obligations does it create for the opposing force?

Proportionality

An attack that may be expected to cause incidental civilian casualties or damage must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. not a ban on civilian casualties — a ban on Excessive ones.

Scenario

A N.S.A.G commander plans to destroy a bridge used by government forces. Destroying it would also flood a civilian hospital downstream. The military advantage is significant. Is the attack lawful? What factors must the commander weigh?

Precaution

All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid or minimize civilian harm. Includes: choice of means/method, timing, warning of civilians, verification of target.

Scenario

A N.S.A.G unit identifies what it believes is a government arms depot in a warehouse in a city. No civilian warning is possible without alerting the military. What precautions must they still take? Is verification required?

Military Necessity

Force may only be used to achieve a legitimate military purpose. Destruction of property not justified by military necessity is prohibited. Often misused by armed groups as a justification — know the limits.

Scenario A N.S.A.G captures a village and orders all food stores destroyed to prevent government forces from using them. Is this lawful under I.H.L? What about burning crops in fields?

3.2 Protected Persons and Objects

Table summary: The table outlines the conditions under which protected status is maintained versus when it is lost.

- Civilians not directly participating in hostilities

• Wounded and sick — of any party

• Medical personnel, facilities, and transport

• Humanitarian workers and I.C.R.C delegates

- Journalists covering the conflict

• Prisoners of War and detainees

- Cultural property (unless military necessity)

• Objects indispensable to civilian survival (food, water)

- Natural environment — protection from widespread damage

- Civilians who directly participate in hostilities — for the duration of that participation

• Medical facilities used for hostile acts — after warning

- Cultural property used for military purposes — after warning

- Humanitarian workers acting outside their mandate

N.S.A.G Challenge: 'Human Shields'

Using civilians to shield military objectives is prohibited. but it does not remove the attacker's obligation to apply proportionality.

Part 4 — Weekly Scenario Exercise Apply Your Learning to a Realistic Field Situation

Scenario: The Siege of Al-Madinah District

Background:

A N.S.A.G calling itself the People's Defense Forces (P.D.F) controls the Al-Madinah district of a mid-size city. Government forces have surrounded the district for 3 weeks. The P.D.F has approximately 400 fighters embedded among 12,000 civilians. You are an I.C.R.C Field Security Coordination Officer who has just arrived in the city. Your delegation has requested access to meet P.D.F commanders to discuss I.H.L compliance.

Situation A — Access Denied

Situation A

The P.D.F commander refuses to meet I.C.R.C delegates. His aide tells you: 'The Geneva Conventions are a tool of Western imperialism. We are a liberation movement — those rules don't apply to us. Come back when the government agrees to a ceasefire.'

Your response exercise:

- On what legal basis do you argue that I.H.L does apply to the P.D.F?

• Which specific I.H.L instrument is most relevant to cite?

- How do you address the 'Western imperialism' framing without losing the dialogue?

• Does the P.D.F's political legitimacy (or lack of it) affect their I.H.L obligations?

Situation B — Detention Without Process

Situation B

You gain access. During your visit you discover the P.D.F holds 23 government soldiers in a school basement. 6 are wounded. The P.D.F commander says they are 'unlawful combatants' who do not deserve P.O.W status because the government army 'started the war'. Three have been held for 45 days with no formal charges, no family notification, and no I.C.R.C visit until now.

Your analysis exercise:

- What is the status of these detainees under I.H.L?

• Does a N.S.A.G have the legal authority to determine 'unlawful combatant' status?

• What does Common Article 3 require regarding their treatment?

• What immediate humanitarian steps must the P.D.F take?

• What does the I.C.R.C have the right to do regarding these detainees?

Situation C — Civilian Harm

Situation C

P.D.F fighters have set up a mortar position on the roof of a functioning clinic — the only medical facility serving the 12,000 civilians in the district. The government army notifies the P.D.F it will strike the clinic unless the position is removed within 2 hours. Civilians and patients cannot be evacuated in time.

The hardest question — your full analysis:

- Has the P.D.F violated I.H.L by using the clinic? What specifically?

- Does the government's warning satisfy its precaution obligation?

- Can the clinic lawfully be struck? Under what conditions?

- What does the proportionality calculation look like here?

• As I.C.R.C delegate on the ground — what do you do Right now?

Image summary: This figure is a text-based graphic. It contains the words DISCUSSION NOTES centered at the top of a solid rectangular background. The figure serves as a title card or a cover page, indicating that the subsequent content relates to notes taken during a discussion.

Discussion Notes

Scenario Discussion Guidance: Situation A — Customary I.H.L + Common Article 3 bind N.S.A.G's regardless of political stance. Frame I.H.L as mutual protection, not external imposition. Situation B — All detainees protected by Common Article 3 minimum standards.

N.S.A.G cannot unilaterally strip P.O.W protections. I.C.R.C has right of visit. Situation C — Using a medical facility as a firing position removes its protection (after warning). Government warning partially satisfies precaution but must assess proportionality. I.C.R.C role: immediate dialogue with both parties simultaneously to stop the attack and demand position removal.

Part 5 — Self-Assessment Questions Test Yourself Before Moving to Week 2

Answer these without referring to the text above. Then check.

Q: What is the difference between jus ad bellum and jus in bello?

Hint: Jus ad bellum = legality of going to war. Jus in bello = I.H.L — how war is conducted. They are completely separate. I.H.L applies equally regardless of who has the 'just cause'.

Q: Name the four Geneva Conventions and what each protects.

Hint: G.C I: Wounded/sick on land. G.C 2: Wounded/sick/shipwrecked at sea. G.C 3: Prisoners of War. G.C 4: Civilians under enemy power.

Q: What is Common Article 3 and Why Does It Matter for N.S.A.G's?

Hint: The minimum standard applicable to all parties in a non-international armed conflict — including N.S.A.G's. Prohibits murder, torture, hostage-taking, summary execution. N.S.A.G's cannot opt out.

Q: What is the difference between 'neutrality' and 'impartiality' in the I.C.R.C context?

Hint: Neutrality = not taking sides politically/militarily (enables access). Impartiality = acting based on need alone, without discrimination (determines who gets help). A neutral actor can still be impartial. They are separate principles with different functions.

Q: Name the four principles of conduct of hostilities.

Hint: Distinction, Proportionality, Precaution, Military Necessity.

Q: Can a N.S.A.G be bound by I.H.L if it has not signed the Geneva Conventions?

Hint: Yes. Customary I.H.L binds all parties. Common Article 3 binds all parties to a N.I.A.C. Additional Protocol 2 may apply if the N.S.A.G controls territory. States' treaty obligations extend to all actors under their jurisdiction and to their conflicts.

Q: What is the I.C.R.C's Right of Initiative and Why is it Important?

Hint: The I.C.R.C can proactively offer its services to any party in a conflict — State or N.S.A.G — without being invited. This is what allows it to approach N.S.A.G's and request access without needing a government's permission.

Q: A P.D.F fighter who was firing on soldiers then drops his weapon and raises his hands. What is his status?

Hint: He is hors de combat — out of the fight. He may not be attacked. He must be treated humanely. If captured, he is entitled to P.O.W status (if in I.A.C) or Common Article 3 protections (if in N.I.A.C).

Part 6 — This Week's Study Plan and I.C.R.C Resources

Recommended Reading — All Free Online

Table summary: The table outlines a prioritized list of ICRC resources for study, ranking them from highest to lowest importance. The most critical materials are introductory documents and treaty texts, followed by summaries and specific database rules, while foundational legal analysis, institutional strategy, and historical accounts are assigned lower priority.

Daily Study Schedule This Week

Table summary: The table outlines a structured daily study plan for learning International Humanitarian Law, progressing from foundational readings and principles to the application of rules through exercises and self-assessment, concluding with a practical communication test over the weekend.

What's Coming — Your 52 Week Journey

Table summary: The table outlines a chronological curriculum divided into modules, progressing from the foundational principles and mandates of international humanitarian law to the classification of conflicts and concluding with the legal obligations and structures of non-state armed groups.

Table summary: The table outlines a comprehensive training curriculum organized by module numbers, covering a broad spectrum of International Humanitarian Law topics, operational methodologies for engaging non-state armed groups, regional contexts in the Middle East and North Africa, and practical delegation skills culminating in final readiness assessments.

End of Week 1

Next week: Classification of Armed Conflicts — the legal threshold that determines which rules apply. 52 weeks. March 2027. You will be ready.

You have reached the end of the document.